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ABSTRACT
The telephone network is used by almost every person in the modern world. With the
rise of Internet access to the PSTN, the telephone network today is rife with telephone spam
and scams. Spam calls are significant annoyances for telephone users, unlike email spam,
spam calls demand immediate attention. They are not only significant annoyances but also
result in significant financial losses in the economy. According to complaint data from the
FTC, complaints on illegal calls have made record numbers in recent years. Americans
lose billions to fraud due to malicious telephone communication, despite various efforts to
subdue telephone spam, scam, and robocalls.
In this dissertation, a study of what causes the users to fall victim to telephone scams is
presented, and it demonstrates that impersonation is at the heart of the problem. Most so-
lutions today primarily rely on gathering offending caller IDs, however, they do not work
effectively when the caller ID has been spoofed. Due to a lack of authentication in the
PSTN caller ID transmission scheme, fraudsters can manipulate the caller ID to imperson-
ate a trusted entity and further a variety of scams. To provide a solution to this fundamental
problem, a novel architecture and method to authenticate the transmission of the caller ID
is proposed. The solution enables the possibility of a security indicator which can pro-
vide an early warning to help users stay vigilant against telephone impersonation scams, as
well as provide a foundation for existing and future defenses to stop unwanted telephone
communication based on the caller ID information.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction in 1876, telephone communication is an integral part of modern
society and a critical component of our modern infrastructure and economy. The Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) ecosystem is at the core of today’s telecommuni-
cation systems. The national and global telephony system is a critical component of our
modern infrastructure and economy. The PSTN is an aggregate of various interconnected
telephone networks that adhere to the core standards recommended by the International
Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), allowing
most telephones around the world to intercommunicate. The current set of PSTN core stan-
dards have been around for several decades, allowing any phone to reach any other phone
through a vast worldwide interconnection of switching centers. In the United States, al-
most every person in the US can be reached with a telephone number as mobile telephone
subscribership penetration rate has already surpassed 100% of the country’s population [1].
Using 2013 statistics, there are about 335 million mobile telephone subscribers [2], with
136 million fixed-telephone subscribers [3], and 34 million VoIP subscribers [4] in the
US with population of 318 million. Each day more than 240 million hours are spent on
telephone calls [5], equating to more than 88 trillion hours each year.
However, with the pervasiveness of telephone subscribership, and the introduction of
IP access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), telephone spam has also
become an increasingly prevalent issue. The high reachability of telephone numbers has
led to telephony being an attractive spam distribution channel. Spammers are leveraging
recent advances in the telephony technology to distribute massive automated spam and
scam calls, also known as robocalls.
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Today, the PSTN is rife with telephone spam, namely voice, voicemail, and SMS spam.
Voice phishing, vishing, or phone fraud has now become a significant and rapidly growing
problem in many countries, including the US [6] and UK [7]. Despite various products and
services aimed at stopping telephone spam, scam and robocalls, complaints about illegal
calls have reached record high levels in recent years. According to recent US government
reports, the number of phone fraud complaints in the US more than doubled in just a matter
of two years from 2013 to 2015 [6]. During the 2016 fiscal year, the national Do-Not-Call
Registry faced a near 50% surge in the number of consumer complaints about unwanted
telemarketing calls, and the total number of complaints that year has grown to more than
5.3 million [8]. In the US, more than 75% of the reported fraud and identity theft attempts
are now communicated over the phone [6].
(a) Phone Fraud Complaints Each Year
Received by the FTC Consumer Sentinel
Network
(b) Call Complaints Each Year Received by the
National Do-Not-Call Registry
Figure 1.1: Recent US Government Statistics on Phone Fraud and Call Complaints
Spam calls are significant annoyances for telephone users unlike email spam, which can
be ignored, spam calls demand immediate attention. When a phone rings, a call recipient
generally must decide whether to accept the call and listen to the call. After realizing that
2
the call contains unwanted information and disconnects from the call, the recipient has
already lost time, money (phone bill), and productivity. A study in 2014, it was found that
75% of people listened to over 19 seconds of a robocall message and the vast majority of
people, 97%, listen to at least 6 seconds [9]. Even when the recipient ignores or declines
the call, today spammers can send a prerecorded audio message directly into the recipient’s
voicemail inbox [10]. Deleting a spam voicemail wastes even more time, taking at least 6
steps to complete in a typical voicemail system.
Telephone spam is not only a significant annoyance, they also result in great financial
loss in the economy, mostly due to scams and identity theft. According to a survey report
in 2014, Americans lost more than $8.6 billion due to phone scams [11].
To deal with this issue, governments, including the US [12] and UK [13], have enacted
laws to restrict most forms of unwanted telephone calls. Furthermore, some governments
have established regulatory agencies and telephone number registries that allow consumers
to explicitly opt out of unwanted calls [14, 15]. For decades, despite the legal actions
prohibiting robocalling and telephone spamming, complaints on illegal calls have reached
record numbers year in many recent years, which indicates that the laws have not deterred
the spammers.
In addition to government efforts, there are also consumer and commercial products that
are made to defend against unwanted calls. In the consumer market, there are many phys-
ical call-blocking devices for landline telephones, and various modern smartphone apps,
that can block unwanted calls from offending caller IDs. According to a 2013 consumer
poll, 22% of US smartphone users used a call-blocking app or a feature to block calls on
their device [16]. Among business and network operators, there is also a supplementary
network feature known as MCID (Malicious Call Identification) that allows the destination
operator to request identification of the offending calling party [17].
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Despite various efforts that reduce telephone spam, scam and robocalls, complaints on
illegal calls has been making record numbers in recent years. Many people have reported
that these countermeasures do not work and want relief [18]. Clearly, all these counter-
measures have so far failed at reducing the growth of telephone spam. Illegal callers today
have access to various technologies aimed at circumventing call blockers and evading iden-
tification. Among them, a practice known as caller ID spoofing is particularly effective at
defeating call blockers, evading identification, and furthering a variety of scams.
The key technical component enabling telephone spam, is that, in the current caller ID
scheme, the caller ID is trivially spoofed. Falsifying the caller ID enables illegal callers to
make their victim believe that they are speaking to someone trusted. Although most mod-
ern mobile phones support the capability to block unwanted calls or SMS using caller ID.
However, Caller ID spoofing also helps malicious callers to defeat anti-spam defenses that
rely on caller ID blacklisting, a malicious caller can easily bypass caller ID blacklisting by
spoofing any number not blacklisted. As most telephone spam defenses today (including
law enforcement) rely on feedback from the users, caller ID spoofing has made identifi-
cation and feedback completely irrelevant. At the root cause of this issue, not only has
telephone spam become economically viable due to VoIP and autodialers, illegal callers
today have access to caller ID spoofing great at circumventing call blockers and evading
identification.
Caller ID spoofing is also pervasively used to assist malicious callers to further a wide
variety of phishing scams. A malicious caller can spoof the caller ID to make it appear
as if a call or SMS originated from a trusted entity, tricking the recipients into divulging
sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, credit card details, and take harmful
actions such as remitting money to the scammers. Many telephone phishing scams are
directly attributable to caller ID spoofing, such as credit card verification scams, IRS tax
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agent scams. Some of these phishers even use audio duplicated from the real institution,
such as the bank, to trick the recipient into divulging their sensitive information.
Caller ID spoofing is often used in a variety of phone scams. To show an example
of how caller ID spoofing is used in phone scams, one type of phone fraud that occurs
frequently is the credit card verification scam, where the spammer spoofs the caller ID
of a credit card issuing bank [19], and then mimicking or duplicating the audio from the
credit card issuer’s interactive voice response system to trick his recipients [20]. The audio
recording tells the victims that their credit cards have been deactivated due to fraud, and is
in urgent need of verifying their personal information to reactivate their account. The true
motive of this scam is to steal the recipients’ credit card and personal information.
Furthermore, caller ID spoofing can also frame true owners of spoofed caller IDs with
illegal behavior. A malicious caller could spoof a known number to commit crimes, such
as making phishing calls, making fake purchase orders, or sending police to a person’s
address for harassment [21]. As a result, true owners of spoofed caller IDs could also end
up in trouble. For organizations, severe brand damage can come as a result of caller ID
spoofing.
Because of the prevalence of caller ID spoofing, it has also led to many become overly
suspicious of phone calls, even when it is for communicating legitimate and critical in-
formation. In a recent revelation about Russian cyberattacks on the Democratic National
Committee (DNC), the DNC blew off FBI’s repeated hack warnings because the worker
could not differentiate a real FBI agent call from an impostor [22]. Because of caller ID
spoofing, many users couldn’t tell apart the real important calls from the malicious calls.
In the US and many other regions, the telephone number follows a numbering format
that identifies the region code, central office code, and subscriber number [23]. If the tele-
phone number is spoofed, the government and law enforcement agencies would typically
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lose key information that could trace the source of the malicious caller. This has led to
increasingly difficult legal enforcement against illegal telephone callers.
To make matters worse, with the increasing availability of VoIP-to-PSTN services, a
spammer may distribute outbound calls from an overseas location, beyond the jurisdiction
of law enforcement. Furthermore, the Internet provides plenty of opportunities for the
malicious caller to hide his true location, such as with proxy, VPN or TOR. Due to the lack
of legal repercussions, foreign-operated phone scams have become increasingly common.
This situation requires an effective solution, given the significant gains made in reduc-
ing email spam, this raises the question: are there email spam solutions that could also be
used to stop telephone spam? Unfortunately, this issue is not easily solved, and, in fact,
most of the simple and effective techniques against email spam cannot be applied to tele-
phone systems. There are significant differences and unique challenges in the telephone
ecosystem that require novel approaches. Many existing solutions have failed to overcome
these challenges and, as a result, have yet to be widely adopted.
1.1 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this proposal is organized as the following: Chapter 2 will first describe
the background information on the public switched telephone network, how the telephone
spam operation works, and how the caller ID is transmitted; Chapter 3 will present a study
on understanding how telephone scam works and why recipients fall victim to them; Chap-
ter 4 will elaborate on the key challenges in dealing with telephone spam and present a
survey of the existing countermeasures and techniques; Chapter 5 will propose a novel ar-
chitecture and method to authenticate the caller ID which facilitates security indication of
the caller ID transmission; Chapter 6 will present the prototype implementations of the pro-
posed authenticated caller ID transmission scheme and present the results and evaluations
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of its performance and the end-user experience; Chapter 7 will summarize the contributions
and conclude this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Public Switched Telephone Network
The public switched telephone network (PSTN) [24] is an aggregation of the world’s
telecommunications networks that is designed for continuous real-time voice communica-
tions. The network consists of national, regional, and local telephony operators, which are
connected together form the PSTN. At the core of the PSTN are switching centers, and
switches can be physically interconnected through fiber optic cables, microwave transmis-
sion links, communications satellites, and submarine telephone cables, etc.
Historically, the network works by establishing a direct connection between any two
points to carry analog signals modulated to voice frequencies, i.e. circuit-switching. Today,
the core PSTN has evolved to carry almost entirely digital signals over fiber optic cables,
sharing bandwidth with various services including Internet and TV, due to its much greater
capacity. Despite the digital advancements, the core principles of the PSTN remain focused
on being a circuit-based or connection-oriented system designed for the reliable delivery
of voice. Compared to the Internet, the PSTN differentiates for its ability to provide highly
reliable and low latency voice communications to its subscribers.
The interconnected public switched telephone network adheres to the core Signaling
System No. 7 (SS7) standards [25] created by the International Telecommunication Union
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), allowing most telephones around the
world to intercommunicate. All telephone terminals in the PSTN use the E.163 and E.164
telephone numbering scheme created by the ITU-T to reference different end-point ad-
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dresses. The combination of ITU-T core standards is what allows telephones around the
world to communicate with each other seamlessly and reliably.
Due to the much greater capacity of IP infrastructure and the wide availability of IP-
based equipment, some telephony service providers have shifted their network infrastruc-
ture to IP-based solutions, and the operation cost of the telephone network has dramatically
decreased. While the core PSTN infrastructure has evolved to be almost entirely IP-based,
the core signaling protocols have not changed. The entire ecosystem still relies on the three-
decade-old Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) [26] suite of protocols, allowing any phone to
reach any other phone through a worldwide interconnection of switching centers. Today,
the cost of a telephone call via the internet is a tiny fraction of what it used to cost for
traditional landlines.
The PSTN network topology is arranged in a hierarchical fashion, and this allows the
network operators to efficiently interconnect and bill for the calls. Each step of the call path
is routed and managed by the network operator and its switching systems. In the United
States and many other regions, the telephony operators generally fall into two categories:
Interexchange Carrier and Termination Carrier.
Interexchange Carrier (IXC), also known as a long distance carrier, is a cross-regional
carrier that carries call traffic between telephone exchanges over long distances. They
are points of high traffic aggregation and they cover larger geographical distances. High-
speed transport links (such as fiber optic cables) are typically used between transit switches.
IXCs typically own or share the various high-bandwidth, fiber-optic trunk lines that span
across the country, and some also provide high-speed switched digital services for data and
multimedia communication.
Termination Carrier, also known as local exchange carrier, is a carrier that provides
call routing services within a local network that terminates at its end users. The termination
carrier may be operating a landline, mobile, or IP-based telephone network. A termination
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Figure 2.1: Simplified Overview of the PSTN hierarchy
carrier is also presubscribed to one or more IXCs to provide calls originating or terminating
outside its network. Most consumers and businesses rely on termination carriers for their
telephone subscriber services. The termination carrier usually has full control over their
own local network, allowing them to define a vertical stack of equipment and protocols to
be used within the local exchange network.
2.1.1 PSTN Call Setup Signaling
Before we discuss the technical detail of the underlying call setup process of establish-
ing a telephone call, we first present an overview of the parties involved in the transmission
of a call request.
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the Parties Involved in the Transmission of a Call Request
Calling Party is the party initiating the call request with a user equipment (UE), such as
a mobile phone, desk phone, or software client that connects with the originating exchange.
Originating Exchange is a switch in the PSTN that generates and transmits the call
request to the destination exchange pertaining to the call request from the calling party.
Transit Exchange is an interconnecting switch in the PSTN that helps to route the call
request from the originating exchange to the destination exchange.
Destination Exchange is the terminating switch in the PSTN that receives the IAM
and sets up the ring with the called party.
Called Party is the party with a user equipment or software client of the intended called
party for the call request.
Also in Figure 5.3, we can see that the overall network can be divided into two cate-
gories: 1) Local Exchange Network, and 2) Interexchange Network.
In general, the sequences within a local exchange network define how user equipment
interacts with the local exchange carrier during a call setup, and the sequences within the
interexchange network define how SS7 switches interact with each other during a call setup.
More details of basic call control and signaling procedures can be found in Q.764.2 [27].
The SS7 process of setting up a telephone call (i.e. dialing and connecting to phone
number) is summarized in Figure 2.3.
As we can see from Figure 2.3, when requesting a telephone call, the calling party first
initiates a dialing or call setup process with Originating Exchange. The specifics of this
process varies between local exchange networks, there are currently more than 8 different
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Figure 2.3: Sequence of Basic Call Control Signaling
standards used to set up a call within a local exchange network, with each standard defining
its own call setup sequence: GSM [28], CDMA [29], 3G UTMS [30], SIP [31], H.323 [32],
IMS [33], VoLTE [34], V5.2 [35], and ISUP [36]. Each type of local exchange network
has it own setup sequence which can be extremely complicated, hence we will not explain
the details of each. However, the general idea is that the local exchange network acts like
a proxy to establish the PSTN call request to the destination exchange from the originating
exchange on behalf of the calling party.
After completing the call setup process within the local exchange network, the originat-
ing exchange generates an initial address message (IAM) and transmits it to the destination
exchange. The initial address message in principle contains all the information that is re-
quired to route the call to the destination exchange and connect the call to the called party.
The IAM is a type of ISDN user part message which follows the ISUP (ISDN User Part)
message format as defined in Q.763 [37]. Typically, the IAM must contain information such
as, nature of connection indicators (Q.763.3.35), forward call indicators (Q.763.3.32), call-
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ing party’s category (Q.763.3.11), transmission medium requirement (Q.763.3.54), called
party number (Q.763.3.9) [37]. In addition, to allow the transmission of the caller ID num-
ber (the calling party’s number) to the called party, today almost all originating exchange
also includes a calling party number (Q.763.3.10) parameter in the IAM.
After receiving the IAM from the originating exchange, assuming the IAM is valid,
the destination exchange generates a call setup process with the called party. During this
process, the called party’s user equipment or software client would get a call setup request
from the destination exchange and start ringing. If the calling party’s number is included in
the IAM, the destination exchange would also transmit this information to the called party
which allows display of the caller ID number during the ring. If the called party number is
valid, the destination exchange also sends back an Address Complete Message (ACM) to
indicate the successful reception of IAM.
Typically, the ACM must include backward call indicators (Q.763.3.5) which contains
information such as charge indicator (indicates whether a call should be charged), called
party’s status indicator (indicates whether the subscriber is free), called party’s category
indicator (indicates the general category of the called party, such as a payphone), etc.
After receiving the address complete message at the originating exchange. The calling
party receives a ringback tone, which provides an audible indication that the called party is
ringing.
When the called party answers the ringing phone, the destination exchange generates an
Answer Message (ANM) and transmits it to the originating exchange. The ANM does not
contain any mandatory fields other than the message type. After receiving the ANM, the
originating exchange and destination exchange will set up a connection and conversation
between the two parties is established.
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2.2 How Telephone Spam Works
We define telephone spam as the mass distribution of unwanted content to modern
telephones in the PSTN, which includes voice spam that distributes unwanted voice content
to answered phones, and voicemail spam that distributes unwanted voice content into the
recipient’s voicemail inbox. While email spam is arguably the most well-known form of
spam, telephone spam has now become more prevalent than ever.
A very common way of disseminating telephone spam is robocalling, which uses an au-
todialer that automatically dials and delivers voice or voicemail messages to a list of phone
numbers. An autodialer is a generic term for any computer program or device that can au-
tomatically initiate calls to telephone recipients. Today, an autodialer is usually a computer
program with Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) connectivity to a high volume VoIP-to-
PSTN carrier, that may include features such as voicemail and SMS delivery, customizable
caller ID, Call Progress Analysis, scheduled broadcast, text-to-speech, Interactive Voice
Response, etc.
Key Players of Telephone Spam
To understand the telephone spam ecosystem, we will first identify and explain the roles of
all players who take part in the routing of a telephone spam. Figure 2.4 shows a graphical
depiction of the routing process: The spammer connects through the Internet to an Inter-
net Telephony Service Provider, then the call is routed through an Interexchange Carrier,
before finally being accepted by the Termination Carrier, who then routes the call to the
victim.
Another way to understand the ecosystem is to show how money flows through the
system, which we display in Figure 2.5: the money flows from the victim to the spammer,
and the spammer uses this money to obtain leads (new phone numbers to spam) and to
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Figure 2.4: Routing of a Spam Call
pay for the spam calls, the Internet Telephony Service Provider receives the money from
the spammer and pays the Interexchange Carrier, who then pays the Termination Carrier.
Next, we examine each of these roles in turn.
Spammer
Leads Seller
VoIP
Carrier
Termination 
Carrier
Interexchange
CarrierVictim
Figure 2.5: Flow of Money in the Telephone Spam Ecosystem
Spammer is the agent that carries out the spamming operation. The spammer could
be part of an organization or an independent contractor that offers spamming-as-a-service.
The goal of the spammer is usually to extract money from victims through sales and scams.
For cost efficiency, spam calls are typically initiated using an autodialer connected to an
Internet Telephony Service Provider to reach the PSTN victims. We will describe the spam-
mer’s operation in more detail in Section 2.2.1.
VoIP carrier, also known as an Internet Telephony Service Provider (ITSP), is a type
of termination carrier that offers telecommunications service over the TCP/IP network, i.e.
the Internet. The ITSP typically offers high volume calling at a lower cost compared to
traditional carriers and generates revenue based on the minutes of calls hosted. Whenever
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the spammer makes an outbound call to a PSTN number, the ITSP will convert the signaling
protocol from VoIP to SS7 and route the converted signal through an interexchange carrier.
Interexchange Carrier (IXC), also known as a long distance carrier, is a cross-regional
carrier that carries call traffic between telephone exchanges over long distances. The IXC
charges its subscribers (mainly termination carrier such as the ITSPs and local mobile/land-
line carriers) for handling long distance phone calls and compensates the next-hop carrier
(such as the recipient’s termination carrier) for access. Unlike the peering model between
Internet service providers [38], the IXC negotiates access rates with other carriers, known
as intercarrier compensation. In the US, intercarrier compensation [39] is a complex system
in which the rates vary according to traffic origination, location, carrier, and traffic type,
and the rates are governed by federal and state regulators. In general, when two carriers are
directly connected, the originating carrier compensates the next-hop carrier for routing the
call in the next-hop carrier’s network.
Termination Carrier, also known as local exchange carrier, is a carrier that provides
call routing services within a local network that terminates at its end users. The termi-
nation carrier may be operating a landline, mobile, or IP-based telephone network. Most
consumers and businesses rely on termination carriers for their telecommunications ser-
vices. The termination carrier typically bills the IXC for the amount of incoming traffic,
known as the access charge. In the US and some other countries, the recipient subscriber
may also be partially billed for incoming calls.
2.2.1 Spammer Operation
Spamming (regardless of the medium) requires three basic elements: a recipient list,
content, and a cost-effective mass distribution channel. In addition, a more sophisticated
spammer may employ circumvention measures to defeat spam countermeasures, and to
avoid being stopped by law enforcement agencies.
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Telephone Numbers
Spamming first requires a list of potential victims to contact, and in the case of telephone
spam: a list of phone numbers. While there are many ways a spammer could gather phone
numbers, the simplest method is to purchase the numbers from a leads seller. We did a
simple Google search (keyword “leads for sale”) and found hundreds of websites that of-
fers access to millions of curated phone numbers for less than $100. There are also other
ways to harvest phone numbers, such as crawling the web, collecting form submissions,
downloading leak databases, covertly gathering through smartphone apps, or simply gen-
erating the numbers based on phone numbering plans. However, we do not know for sure
the most popular means of obtaining a list of phone numbers for spamming, due to the lack
of existing studies. Once the spammer gathers a list of phone numbers, the spammer can
load it in an autodialer for mass distribution of the content.
Voice Content
The content of telephone spam is typically a prerecorded audio stream made by either
recording human voice or by using a text-to-speech synthesizer program. Telephone spam
can also deliver interactive voice content, with the use of an Interactive Voice Response
(IVR) system. When the recipient answers a call from an autodialer with interactive con-
tent, the recipient can interact with the system through voice and keypad inputs, and an
automated voice message is played back based on the interaction.
There are a wide variety of spam types, such as telemarketing, impersonation scam,
debt collection, political campaigns, one-ring scam, and so on. To provide insight into the
telephone spam content, we collected 100+ audio samples from various publicly available
sources where audio recordings of voice or voicemail spam are uploaded. We perform this
analysis to gain a general understanding of voice and voicemail spam, and we emphasize
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that, due to the biased method of data collection, these results do not constitute measure-
ments that reflect trends on the whole of voice and voicemail spam. However, these results
provide needed background and insight into actual voice and voicemail spam. We will de-
scribe the following prevalent types of spam: credit card verification scam, fake tax agent
scam, and political robocalls.
In the credit card verification scam samples, the called recipients are informed that their
credit card account was deactivated, and they are asked to enter their credit card and social
security number over the phone to verify their identity and get the account reactivated.
While we were only able to listen to the audio of the call, based on comments from some
of the uploaders, the scammers would spoof the caller ID to make it look as if the call
originated from the credit card issuer. All of these scam calls used an Interactive Voice
Response system to interact with the recipients and collect their credit card information.
We found that the audio from the scammer’s IVR system came from either a synthesized
voice or audio duplicated from the IVR system of the real credit card issuer. From what
we observed, the use of caller ID spoofing and sound duplicated from the real credit card
issuer’s IVR system made it almost indistinguishable from a real credit card verification
call.
In the fake tax agent scam samples, the recipient receives a call from the scammer
identifying himself as a tax agent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and provides a
fake badge number. The scammer proceeds to tell the recipient that he or she owes a
specific amount of money to the IRS. Often, the scammers demand immediate payment
and threaten jail, deportation, or loss of driver’s license if the victim does not pay. Based
on the comments from the uploaders, the scammers would spoof their caller ID to make
it look as if the call originated from a government agency by showing an area code from
202 (Washington, DC). These scammers seem to target immigrants [40]. We found that
the majority used a live person to interact with the victim, and the rest used a prerecorded
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synthesized voice without an IVR system. One thing we noted was that all of the live
person scammers had a South Asian accent, and in our opinion, the accent had made the
call sound highly suspicious and easy to recognize as a scam (which might explain why it
was posted online as a scam).
In the political robocall samples, the typical content is a prerecorded message making
a political advertisement, or a poll asking the recipient about their political opinion. In the
United States, political robocalls are exempt from regulation by the national Do-Not-Call
Registry and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Before a national or state
level election, they are distributed in high frequency using voice and voicemail broadcasting
autodialers. All of the audio samples contained a prerecorded message, and most polls used
an IVR system to interact with the recipient.
Mass Distribution
Mass distribution is the next critical step to a successful spam operation. The goal is to
massively and cost-effectively deliver the spam content to a list of telephone numbers.
Using VoIP service to distribute calls to PSTN numbers, the content can be dissemi-
nated at a much higher volume, and at a fraction of the cost compared to traditional tele-
phony. To understand the distribution cost of spamming, we researched the prices and
found hundreds of VoIP service providers offering pay-by-the-minute calling service to US
telephone numbers priced around $0.01 per minute. We also found some fixed monthly-fee
pricing model with unlimited calling for about $150, however, these service providers tend
to target small businesses, and these plans usually come with throttling, so high volume
calling services are almost always offered with a pay-by-the-minute model.
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Some VoIP service providers (such as CallFire 1 and Call-Em-All 2 ) even cater specif-
ically to telemarketers, providing features such as integrated autodialer and customizable
caller ID in their service.
Circumvention
Spamming is an adversarial game, as spam defenses are widely introduced, the spammer
has an incentive to defeat them. According to a poll conducted by Harris Poll on behalf
of WhitePages in 2013, 22% of US smartphone users used a call-blocking app or a feature
to block calls on their device [16]. Most mobile phones today has the basic capability to
automatically block calls from a list of unwanted callers.
For the spammers today, two common ways to defeat them is to use voicemail injection
and caller ID spoofing.
Voicemail injection is a recent extension of the autodialer which delivers prerecorded
voice messages into the recipients’ voice mailbox (voicemail). Typically, when a phone
call is unanswered or declined, it gets forwarded to an answering machine that lets the
caller leave a voice message. A voicemail broadcasting autodialer uses Answering Machine
Detection (AMD) [41] technology to automatically complete the process of inserting a
prerecorded voice message into the recipient’s voicemail. A more recent type of voicemail
broadcaster can even deliberately trigger the recipient’s voicemail, a technique known as
Forced Busy Channel [10], to directly inject a voice message into the recipient’s voicemail
without waiting for the call to be unanswered or declined.
Caller ID spoofing is the practice of deliberately falsifying the caller ID information
sent to the recipient that identifies the caller of a phone call. It is particularly effective for
defeating the call blockers and helps to further a variety of scams. The caller ID service
1https://www.callfire.com/
2https://www.call-em-all.com/
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provides the caller’s telephone number (and in some cases the caller’s name) to the recipi-
ent before or during the ring of an incoming call. It allows the recipient to decide whether
to answer a call based on the caller ID information, or to call back if the call could not
be answered. The caller ID number is also widely used in other non-voice communication
services, such as SMS, MMS, and many smartphone apps. The caller ID number is typi-
cally provided by the caller’s switch, which can control what caller ID number is sent on a
call-by-call basis. For general consumers, a legally mandated privacy feature allows them
to hide the calling number [42]. However, malicious callers can also take advantage of the
declarative nature of the caller ID mechanism to spoof or block the caller ID number, in or-
der to defeat spam filters and further a variety of scams. The caller ID number can be easily
spoofed because there is no built-in authentication mechanism, and it is not immediately
verifiable by the recipient. The caller’s service provider does not have any legal obligation
to ensure that the caller ID number in the call request header is indeed owned by the caller
before it is transmitted. In fact, some ITSPs today advertise customizable caller ID as a
service feature.
2.2.2 Telephone Spam Samples
We collected 100+ audio samples from various publicly available Internet sources such
as SoundCloud, YouTube, and LiveLeak, where audio recordings of voice or voicemail are
voluntarily uploaded by individuals and corporations.
In the credit card verification scam samples, the called recipients are informed that their
credit card account was deactivated, and they are asked to enter their credit card and social
security number over the phone to verify their identity and get the account reactivated.
While we only were able to listen to the audio of the call, based on comments from some
of the uploaders, the scammers would spoof the caller ID to make it look as if the call
originated from the credit card issuer. All of these scam calls used an Interactive Voice
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Response system to interact with the recipients and collect their credit card information.
We found that the audio from the scammer’s IVR system came from either a synthesized
voice or audio duplicated from the IVR system of the real credit card issuer. From what
we observed, the use of caller ID spoofing and sound duplicated from the real credit card
issuer’s IVR system made it almost indistinguishable from a real credit card verification
call.
In the fake tax agent scam samples, the recipient receives a call from the scammer
identifying himself as a tax agent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and provides a
fake badge number. The scammer proceeds to tell the recipient that he or she owes a
specific amount of money to the IRS. Often, the scammers demand immediate payment
and threaten jail, deportation, or loss of driver’s license if the victim does not pay. Based
on the comments from the uploaders, the scammers would spoof their caller ID to make
it look as if the call originated from a government agency by showing an area code from
202 (Washington, DC). These scammers seem to target immigrants [40]. We found that
the majority used a live person to interact with the victim, and the rest used a prerecorded
synthesized voice without an IVR system. One thing we noted was that all of the live
person scammers had a South Asian accent, and in our opinion, the accent had made the
call sound highly suspicious and easy to recognize as a scam (which might explain why it
was posted online as a scam).
In the political robocall samples, the typical content is a prerecorded message making
a political advertisement, or a poll asking the recipient about their political opinion. In the
United States, political robocalls are exempt from regulation by the national Do-Not-Call
Registry and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Before a national or state
level election, they are distributed in high frequency using voice and voicemail broadcasting
autodialers. All of the audio samples contained a prerecorded message, and most polls used
an IVR system to interact with the recipient.
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2.3 Overview of the Caller ID
Since its introduction in the 1990s, caller ID service has now become ubiquitous in
almost every form of telephone service. The caller ID is a generic name for a supplementary
service offered by the called party’s telephone company that presents the calling party’s
telephone number to the called party’s user equipment during an incoming call. It helps
the called party to decide whether to answer a call based on the caller’s phone number,
and, to call back the caller if the call could not be answered. Today, the caller ID is also
used in other telephone services, such as the SMS and MMS, and, with the prevalence of
smartphones, many apps and services also rely on caller ID for identification.
The core process of providing the caller ID is known as Calling Line Identification Pre-
sentation (CLIP), which was first defined in ITU-T Recommendation Q.731.3 [43] for the
Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) network in 1993. The SS7 network is the backbone infras-
tructure for most of the world’s public switched telephone network (PSTN) telephone calls.
Even as the telephone backbone moves towards being carried by an IP packet-based infras-
tructure, Q.731.3 still plays a major role in providing the caller ID for telecommunications
and will continue to do so for many years to come.
In all major existing call signaling protocols (SS7, H.323, and SIP), caller ID is either
provided by the originating exchange or by the calling party. In SS7 and SIGTRAN (IP
version of SS7), caller ID is defined by the calling party number (CPN) parameter, where
the parameter is an optional part of the Initial Address Message (IAM). The IAM is sent
to the destination exchange as part of the basic call procedures according to Q.764 [27]
to initiate a call. The IAM routes through transit exchange switches until it reaches the
destination exchange of the called party, in which the called party’s local exchange carrier
would convert and retransmit the CPN to a specific caller ID format for the called party’s
user equipment during the incoming call setup process, e.g. mobile or landline.
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Figure 2.6: Specifications of the Calling Party Number (CPN) Parameter
2.3.1 How Caller ID Spoofing Works
In the process of providing the caller ID, the originating exchange can control what
caller ID number is sent on a call-by-call basis. As the PSTN (public switched telephone
network) is traditionally regarded as a closed network of SS7 exchange switches between
trusted operators, usually only an SS7 switch operator or a private branch exchange (PBX)
owner has the capability to customize the caller ID. Since it was prohibitively expensive
for individuals and small businesses to gain switch level access to the SS7 network, in most
telephone services, their caller IDs are typically managed by the caller’s telephone carrier.
However, with growing access to the PSTN from the Internet, there are now many in-
ternet telephone service providers (ITSPs) that provide telephone services over an Internet
connection. With ITSPs, individuals and businesses are no longer limited to telephone
services from their local telephone service providers. With an Internet connection, a mali-
cious caller now has access to a world of ITSPs that can provide features such as caller ID
customization/spoofing.
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To spoof the caller ID, the caller’s originating exchange would declare the CPN param-
eter with false information. In the US and many other jurisdictions, the caller’s telephone
service provider does not have any legal obligation to ensure that the caller ID is verified
before it is transmitted. Even in jurisdictions that forbid telephone service providers from
providing falsely declared caller IDs, with Internet access to an untrustworthy telephone
service provider, it is easy for a malicious caller to start the call request from a different
origin, and transmit the fake caller ID.
At the heart of the issue, there is a lack of authenticity and accountability in the trans-
mission of telephone identities. The PSTN has transformed from a closed trusted network
to a diverse global ecosystem, mutual trust can no longer be relied upon to guard against the
abuses of trust in the caller ID transmission. Addressing this issue requires the core protocol
to provide a mechanism to ensure authenticity of the caller ID. This is why we advocate for
a standardized caller ID authentication scheme. By providing authentication to the caller
ID, accountability of the caller ID can be enforced. However, for viable deployment of au-
thenticated caller ID transmission, it requires mutual interoperability. Therefore, design a
scheme for the core PSTN protocol is the key to transforming the telephone ecosystem into
a community that could finally rely on the authenticity and accountability of caller IDs.
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Chapter 3
UNDERSTANDING WHY TELEPHONE SCAMS WORK
The rise of telephone spam, scam, fraud, phishing or vishing, is a significant and grow-
ing problem. According to FTC reports, the national Do-Not-Call Registry received more
than 5.3 million unwanted call complaints in 2016, a near 50% surge from 2015 [8]. Phone
fraud complaints have also more than doubled from 2013 to 2015, and more than 75% of
the reported frauds are now attempted over the phone. Impersonation scams were the top
fraud [6], these impostors called the recipients while pretending to be anyone from the IRS
to a family member in trouble, from tech support to a business partner that turned out to be
bogus.
With the growing dissatisfaction of telephone scams, however, little research has been
done to study why people fall for telephone scams. Although telephone phishing has been
in the news and has continued to exist for several decades, no past study has specifically
measured what contributes to the effectiveness telephone scam. In this chapter, we present
the results of an empirical telephone phishing study, designed to systematically measure
the different attributes in relation to the success rate of telephone scams. Although the
current understanding of telephone scams might be accepted as conventional wisdom, none
had specifically validated such claims with hard empirical evidence. From this study, we
hope to dispel some myths about what is “scammy” and what is not. The knowledge
obtained from the study has scientific merits in learning why some telephone scams work,
and why some would not. With the understanding of the key attributes that make a scam
convincing, we can focus on developing prevention methods to challenge the fundamentals
of telephone phishing attacks. By shedding light on what causes the recipients to fall for
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or be suspicious of telephone scams, we can help to educate the public the key factors that
make them vulnerable these types of attacks.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We taxonomize telephone phishing as a type of social engineering attack where it is
formulated with a set of visual and voice attributes.
• We describe a systematic approach to test the significance of each attribute and con-
duct an empirical study using the approach.
• We describe a set of analysis criteria to evaluate the results and used the criteria to
analyze the results of the empirical study.
• We present our evaluation of the study and provide our recommendations for solving
the telephone phishing problem.
This chapter contains work currently under review in the IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy 2018.
3.1 Background and Insights
With the emergence of distribution technology, economical cost, high reachability, and
computerized automation, the telephone has become an attractive medium for disseminat-
ing unsolicited information. The use of the telephone for phishing has become increasingly
popular. According to the FTC, the telephone is the leading channel (>75%) of all commu-
nication channels for reported fraud attempts [44]. As with any form of spam, it ultimately
boils down to three key ingredients: (1) the recipient list, (2) the content, and (3) the dis-
tribution channel, as Tu et al. point out [45]. With modern technology and services, the
telephone has become a cost-effective channel to massively deliver content. Telephone
scam relies on distributing deceitful voice content, whereas telephone spam or telemar-
keting primarily distributes marketing and advertising content. In telephone scam, fraud,
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phishing or vishing, the goal of the voice content is trick the human victim into performing
harmful actions for the benefit of the attacker. Hence, telephone phishing falls into the
category of social engineering attack where the goal is to exploit human vulnerabilities.
Compared to other forms of phishing, such as email and website phishing, it differen-
tiates by having the potential to make the scam more convincing by falsifying both visual
and auditory perceptions to induce the victims into falling for the scam. Visually, the scam
can be made more convincing by altering the caller ID, such as by spoofing the caller ID,
manipulating the area code, and impersonating a familiar contact name. With the character-
istic of demanding immediate decision upon an incoming call, a scammer can apply visual
trickeries to make the recipient answer the phone. Once the scammer has successfully
tricked the recipient into answering the call, the attacker then moves to using deceitful
voice content to exploit the human recipient. Within the voice content, an attacker can
spoof, duplicate or make the speech sound like it is from a known organization or a famil-
iar personal contact. To provide a motivation for the recipient to divulge confidential or
personal information, the scammer presents a scenario that satisfies the human need for a
justification to perform a (harmful) action.
Hence, by looking at telephone phishing from a perspective that can be characterized
by the visual and voice attributes which it embodies, a systematic approach can be used to
study and understand why some scams work better than others. As many are now under-
taking the crusade of curbing the telephone spam problem, understanding why telephone
phishing works can help us design solutions that challenge the core foundations of tele-
phone scam.
3.2 Study Design
The goal of the study is to design a systematic approach that can reveal the factors in
telephone scams which make them effective. Our approach to designing the study is to first
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identify the attributes that could lead to an effective telephone phishing scam. After that,
design a set of experiments and procedures that allow comparisons of different variations of
an attribute. The approach will then conducted with an empirical study. Each experiment
will follow a standardized procedure and the procedure will be conducted on each group
simultaneously. We will tabulate the results and perform analysis on the results. Finally,
we provide a discussion on what could be learned from the analysis and provide our rec-
ommended solutions for solving the telephone phishing problem. The study was conducted
with IRB approval.
3.2.1 Attributes
To identify the telephone scam attributes, we gathered and reviewed more than 100
existing real-world telephone scam samples from various Internet sources, including the
FTC website, IRS website, news websites, YouTube, SoundCloud, user comments, and
industry surveys. While reviewing the scams, we looked for properties that can be grouped
into separate classes and then systematically categorized them into attributes that distinct
from each other.
The attributes identified in our study are as follows:
Area Code
In North America, the area code is the first three digits on the caller ID. The area code
specifies the geographic location associated with the caller’s phone number, e.g. 202 is
Washington, DC. In addition, a toll-free phone number is also identified by the three-digit
prefix similar to a geographic area code, e.g. 800, 888, 877, etc. According to reports
of real-world IRS impersonation scams [46, 47], many scammers appeared to have either
spoofed or obtained a 202 area code or toll-free area code on their caller IDs to make it
appear as if the IRS is calling. It seems that the area codes could be one of the attributes
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that make the scam more convincing. To test this hypothesis, in our experiments varied the
caller ID area code between—202 (Washington, DC), 800 (Toll-free), and 480 (the area
code of the University Location).
Caller Name
Today, most telephone terminals have the capability of associating a name with a telephone
number. With a stored contact, an incoming call from the stored contact would show the
name associated with the caller ID, helping the recipient to identify the caller. To perform
a spear phishing attack, a malicious caller could spoof the caller ID of a known stored
contact, such as impersonating the HR department of a company, to scam other victims
in the organization. This is definitely an attribute that could have important implications.
For legal and IRB approval reasons, we could not actually spoof a known caller name.
Instead, we asked our telephone service department to temporarily create a new contact in
the university’s internal phone directory and associated a legitimate sounding name with
the telephone number. We used that telephone number in our scam experiments to produce
a similar effect to caller name spoofing.
Voice Production
According to reports of real-world telephone scams, some used a robotic (synthesized)
voice, while others used a human voice to communicate with the recipient [47, 48]. To test
the effect of synthesized voices vs. human voices, we downloaded recordings of existing
telephone scams, listened to them, and recreated the scams using a text-to-speech synthe-
sizer to generate a speech similar to the real-world scams. To mimic the human voice ver-
sion of the scams, we also recorded human voices speaking the exact same announcement
message.
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Gender
From listening to recordings of actual telephone scams, some used a male voice and some
used a female voice. Perhaps the voice gender is an attribute that could make the scam
more convincing. To test if the vocal gender of the voice could have an effect on the
telephone scam, we varied the voice gender between male and female in the text-to-speech
synthesizer.
Accent
From the reports of telephone scams, some spoke with an Indian accent and some others
spoke with an American accent. It seems that recipients would be more wary of scams that
spoke in a foreign accent, and would be less suspicious of scams that spoke in an American
accent. To test if this could have an effect on the telephone scam, we varied the voice accent
between Indian and American in our experiments.
Entity
From the gathering of real-world telephone scams, two types of scams stood out in term of
the number of reports: IRS impersonation scams [49] and HR impersonation scams [50].
In these scams, the scammer claimed to be from the IRS or the company’s HR department.
While the IRS scams can affect any taxpayer in the US, the HR scams are usually targeted
toward people in a specific company. It seems that a more targeted attack would have
more success. To test if this attribute works, we varied the impersonated entity of our
scams between the IRS and ASU’s HR department. To simulate the real-world HR scams
as closely as possible, we initially wanted to impersonate our university’s HR department,
however, our HR department had strong objections about using their name to conduct scam
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experiments. As a compromise, our experiments claimed to be from a bogus but legitimate-
sounding HR-like department called the ASU “W-2 Administration”.
Scenario
Every scam has to provide a motivation for the targeted individuals to perform a certain
(harmful) action. Real-world telephone scams created various scenarios to motivate their
victims, such as tax lawsuits, payroll issues, credit card verification, etc. The type of mo-
tivation are generally either fear-based (such as lawsuits, audits, jail time, losses, etc.) and
reward-based (prizes, money, gifts, etc.). It seems that the recipients might be more mo-
tivated by fear than reward due to loss aversion. In decision theory, loss aversion refers
to people’s tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains. Whichever
the scenario, it has to be related to the entity that the scammer is impersonating. In our
empirical study, we crafted a fear-based and a reward-based scenario related to each entity.
These scenarios were inspired by real-world IRS scams and HR scams. To test each type of
scenario, our message announcements varied between Tax Lawsuit (IRS), Unclaimed Tax
Return (IRS), Payroll Withheld (HR), and Bonus Issued (HR).
3.2.2 Experiments
To test these attributes, we designed the experiments such that variations of each at-
tribute can be compared under similar environmental conditions. To study the effectiveness
of two attribute variations, e.g. A and B, we would split the testing comparing two varia-
tions of the attribute to see which one performs better. Both variations of the experiment
will be conducted simultaneously under the same controlled environment. At its core, the
experiments are designed similar to the concept of A/B testing.
When performing experiments under same environmental conditions, one of the design
issues is to decide whether to counterbalance the environmental conditions such that all
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variations of background attributes are tested. This would theoretically avoid the of pos-
sible interference due to a specific set of background conditions. However, performing a
counterbalanced measures design does not come without costs and absurdities. Counter-
balancing the conditions is performed by splitting the experiments into groups of every
possible order of attribute conditions. Given the large number of attributes that we have
identified, and of each attribute with 2-4 variations that we have identified, it would re-
quire us to create 384 separate groups of experiments! Every new variation of an attribute
increases the numbers of groups by a multiple, and every new attribute increases the num-
bers of groups by an order of magnitude. This is unfeasible for an empirical study when
there are real-world time and resource constraints. Furthermore, when testing the scam at-
tributes, counterbalancing the environmental conditions would be nearly impossible, as the
possible attributes and variations are potentially infinite. There are still many other possible
attributes and variations that have yet been identified. Therefore, we are never able to test
all background conditions. As a realistic solution to this problem, instead of experimenting
with an absurd number of background conditions, we compare variations of each attribute
under a specific set of background conditions that seem to be the most popular in the real
world. With what we gathered, we decide on a standard background condition: a phishing
scam with area code 202, with no caller name, speaking in a synthesized, male voice, in
American accent, impersonating the IRS, motivating the recipient with a tax lawsuit.
The set of 10 experiments and the variations of each attribute are listed in Table 3.1.
3.2.3 Population
To make our experiments more relatable to the real world, we initially sought to run our
experiments on the general population as this is what we thought most scammers would
target in the real world. However, the IRB only allowed us to conduct the experiments
on our university’s internal population. Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
33
No. Caller ID Area Code Location Caller Name Voice Production Gender Accent Entity Scenario
E1 202-869-4555 Washington, DC N/A Synthesizer Male American IRS Tax Lawsuit
E2 800-614-1339 Toll-free N/A Synthesizer Male American IRS Tax Lawsuit
E3 480-939-5666 University Location N/A Synthesizer Male American IRS Tax Lawsuit
E4 202-869-2440 Washington, DC N/A Synthesizer Female American IRS Tax Lawsuit
E5 202-869-2442 Washington, DC N/A Synthesizer Male American IRS Unclaimed Tax Return
E6 202-849-5707 Washington, DC N/A Human Male American IRS Tax Lawsuit
E7 202-869-4024 Washington, DC N/A Human Male Indian IRS Tax Lawsuit
E8 480-462-2513 University Location N/A Synthesizer Male American ASU Payroll Withheld
E9 480-462-2515 University Location W-2 Administration Synthesizer Male American ASU Payroll Withheld
E10 480-462-2517 University Location N/A Synthesizer Male American ASU Bonus Issued
Table 3.1: List of All Experiments and Their Attributes
it is illegal for us to make unsolicited robocalls to residences, or we could be sued for
$1,500 in damages for each violation [12]. Complying with this law would require us to
obtain explicit permissions before sending the scam calls. However, doing so would nullify
the authenticity of our scam experiments. Because if the subjects already knew that they
were going to be scammed, it would affect their vigilance and the study results would be
unrealistic. We have never heard of any reports of a scammer complying with the law
asking for explicit permission in the real world. As law-abiding researchers, hence, the
best alternative is to conduct the experiments without obtaining explicit permissions is to
conduct the experiments on our university’s internal numbers. We managed to obtained
IRB permission to conduct the telephone phishing experiments on our university’s internal
numbers with a waiver for informed consent.
The population of the study were work telephone numbers that were associated with
university staffs and faculties. The work phones were Cisco IP phones, model UC Phone
CP-8961. Due to the huge population size of our university, we could only realistically
contact a subset of the population as there are cost and time constraints associated with any
study. Once the study has begun, the marginal benefit associated with gathering more infor-
mation diminishes over time. In addition, in an internal setting where the awareness of an
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ongoing telephone scam could spread out quickly, scam awareness could start influencing
our data if a longer time is needed to disseminate the calls. With all these factors in mind,
we decided that a population of 3,000 recipients (300 per experiment) is a reasonable size
for the empirical study.
To compile the list of telephone numbers, we first wrote a custom tool to bulk download
ASU’s internal phone directory. For the real-world scammer, our ASU phone directory is
also publicly available on the Internet 1 for crawling.
To minimize selection bias, the telephone numbers were randomly chosen from the
university telephone directory, then the chosen contacts were randomly put into one of the
10 experiment groups. The sample selection procedure was as follows:
1. Compile the list of work telephone numbers associated with university staffs and
faculties.
2. Remove telephone numbers of people already aware of the study.
3. Associate a computer-generated random ID to each telephone number.
4. Sort the random IDs.
5. Select the first 3,000 sorted random IDs.
6. For each 3,000 sorted random ID, incrementally assign an experiment number (1-10)
with wraparound.
3.2.4 Procedure
There were several considerations that went into the design of the procedure. First,
we need to make sure that the procedure is standardized across all experiments, such that
1https://isearch.asu.edu/asu-people/
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the results are directly comparable to each other. Second, we need to ensure that process
minimizes false positives and false negatives, otherwise, the study results could be unreli-
able. Last but not least, the procedures also need to be carried out ethically and minimize
potential harm to the participant.
To ensure that the procedure is standardized, we decided to use an autodialer to auto-
mate the process of sending out the telephone calls and collecting the recipients’ responses.
We avoided using a live person to conduct the procedure as we believe using a live per-
son could introduce inconsistency. No person can speak in the exact same way for every
call, therefore, having a “Johnny” speaking to the recipients could potentially create distur-
bances to the attributes tested. Although using a live person to interact with the recipient is
what many scammers have done, in the real world, telephone scammers have also been us-
ing autodialers to distribute scam calls for decades. Therefore, our procedure is applicable
to many real-world scams.
Every experiment followed a standard procedure that is summarized in Figure 3.1. The
procedure has several parts that require inputs from the recipient. It should be noted that
a recipient could break off from the procedure at any point by simply disconnecting the
phone, hence not every recipient would follow the procedure until the end. Similar to a
real-world scam, a recipient may quickly realize that this is a scam or already know the
scam exists, and therefore hang up on the phone call.
The procedure first begins with a ring on the recipient’s work phone. When the phone
is ringing, the incoming call screen shows the caller ID and the caller name (in experiment
E9). The incoming call screen incorporates the visual attribute properties of each particular
experiment. An example of the incoming call screen is shown in Figure 3.2a. In all of our
experiments, the caller ID showed up as 91xxxxxxxxxx, where xxxxxxxxxx is the caller ID
used in the respective experiment. Our university’s work phone adds a 91 prefix to every
incoming phone call from an external source as all of the calls were distributed from an
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Ring and show 
visual attribute properties
Answer?
Scenario announcement
with voice attribute properties
 True 
Press 1?
Follow up announcement
and request last 4 SSN digits
 True 
Press any digit?
Debriefing announcement
and request survey participation
 True 
Press 1?
Survey questions
 True 
Reearcher contact info 
and IRB statement
 False 
Disconnect call
Figure 3.1: Procedure of Each Experiment
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external telephone service provider, similar to what a real-world scammer would do. The
91 prefix is present in almost every phone call at our university and therefore we believe its
effect is negligible. For Experiment 9, the incoming call screen also shows a caller name
as shown in Figure 3.2b. This experiment was designed to simulate a scammer spoofing
a known caller name. For legal and ethical reasons, we could not actually spoof a phone
number. Instead, we asked our telephone service department to temporarily create a new
contact in the university’s internal phone directory and associated a legitimate sounding
HR department name “W-2 Administration” with the telephone number. We used that
temporary phone number to forward phone calls from our autodialer, which added the “For”
prefix in the experiments. The end result of the caller name was “For W-2 Administration”,
which was shown as the caller name in the experiment. As far as we know, no one reported
suspicion on the “For” prefix.
(a) All Experiments Except Experiment E9 (b) Experiment E9 With Caller Name
Displayed
Figure 3.2: Incoming Call Screen of Different Experiments
After displaying the incoming call screen, if the call is answered, it starts by play-
ing a prerecorded scenario announcement message. The prerecorded scenario announce-
ment message incorporates the voice attribute properties of each particular experiment. We
crafted the announcement messages to mimic what a real-world scammer would say. Many
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of the words and sentences in the announcement messages were borrowed from the 100+
scam samples that we collected.
In experiments using the IRS Tax Lawsuit scenario, the transcript of the announcement
message is as follows:
This is an urgent notice! This is a final notice from the IRS. The reason for this
call is to inform you that the IRS is filing a lawsuit against you. Your action is
required immediately, or a penalty will be assessed. To speak to an IRS agent
and get more information about this case, please press 1 on your phone now.
In experiments using the IRS Unclaimed Tax Return scenario, the transcript of the
announcement message is as follows:
This is an urgent notice! This is a final notice from the IRS. The reason for this
call is to inform you that the IRS has an unclaimed tax return for you that is due
to expire within three days. Your action is required immediately. To speak to
an IRS agent and get more information about claiming your tax refund, please
press 1 on your phone now.
In experiments using the ASU Payroll Withheld scenario, the transcript of the an-
nouncement message is as follows:
Dear ASU employee. This is an urgent notice! This is a final notice from the
ASU W-2 administration office. The reason for this call is to inform you that
to process your next Friday payroll, you are required to update your 2016 tax
information immediately. To speak to a staff agent and get more information,
please press 1 on your phone now.
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Our university has a publicly available payroll calendar on the HR department’s website
2 , hence a real-world scammer could also use this information to craft an announcement
message based on the payroll information.
In experiments using the ASU Bonus Issued scenario, the transcript of the announce-
ment message is as follows:
Dear ASU employee. This is an urgent notice! This is a final notice from the
ASU W-2 administration office. The reason for this call is to inform you a
performance bonus has been issued to your account. Your action is required
immediately. To speak to a staff agent and get more information, please press
1 on your phone now.
Our university has a publicly available webpage listing the types performance-based
bonuses for faculties and staffs 3 , hence a real-world scammer could also use this informa-
tion to craft an announcement message based on the performance bonus information.
Every scenario announcement message requests the recipient to enter 1 to continue to
the next step. The purpose of this action is to reduce the likelihood of recipients making
some random input actions without first finish hearing the scenario announcement with the
voice attribute properties of each particular experiment. The action also helps to filter out
answers from answering machines.
If the recipient pressed 1 shortly after the scenario announcement message, a follow-
up announcement message will be played. The follow-up announcement message is as
follows:
2https://www.asu.edu/fs/documents/2017-BiWeekly-Calendar.pdf
3https://cfo.asu.edu/compensation
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Please wait for the next available agent. Thank you for holding. Your call will
be connected shortly. Please enter the last four digits of your social security
number on your phone now.
This follow-up message was the same for every experiment. The goal of the follow-up
message is to trick the recipients into divulging the last four digits of their social security
number. in the real world, the last four digits of the social security number can be all
a criminal need to perpetuate financial and identity fraud [51]. Other parts of the social
security number can also be inferred from the recipient’s phone number [52]. To minimize
potential risk to the recipient, we did not record which digits were pressed, we instead
recorded if any particular (0–9) digit was pressed.
Pressing any digit shortly after the follow-up message will immediately lead to a de-
briefing announcement and a request to participate in our phone survey. The debriefing
message is as follows:
Hi, I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Adam Doupé in the
department of computer science at Arizona State University. I am conducting a
research study to measure the effectiveness of telephone phishing. The reason
you are receiving this message is because I would like to inform you that what
you just did could potentially lead you becoming exploited in a real telephone
scam. However, I would like to assure you that this is not an actual scam, none
of your social security information was actually collected.
We would like to invite you to participate in our phone survey, to help us better
understand your thoughts about the scam. You will be able to listen to the
survey questions right after this message. Your participation in this survey is
voluntary. There are no foreseeable risks for your participation. If you choose
not to participate or to withdraw from the survey at any time, there will be
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no penalty. Your responses will be anonymous. The results of this study may
be used in reports, presentations, or publications but your identity will not be
used. Please press 1 to listen to the survey questions or participate in the phone
survey.
The debriefing announcement and survey questions were recorded with the researcher’s
real voice emphasize the fact that whatever they listened to was not a real scam.
The survey consisted of two questions. If the recipient pressed 1 shortly after the de-
briefing message, the first survey question is as follows:
Thank you. Could you please help us understand if the scam was able to con-
vince you to enter your social security number? Please use the number on your
keypad to answer this question. If "yes", please press 1. If "no" please press 0.
We recorded the input digit shortly after the first survey question. If 1 was pressed, the
second question is as follows:
Thank you. Could you please help us understand what was the most important
factor that made the scam convincing? We will record your voice response for
this question. At the tone, please state briefly what you thought was the most
important factor. When you are finished, please press the pound key to end
recording.
If 0was pressed shortly after the first survey question, the second question is as follows:
Thank you. Could you please help us understand what was the most important
reason you did not believe in the scam? We will record your voice response for
this question. At the tone, please state briefly what you thought was the most
important reason. When you are finished, please press the pound key to end
recording.
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We recorded the participant’s voice recording for the second question. After the second
survey question, the autodialer system plays the following ending message:
Thank you. This is the end of the research experiment. If you have any ques-
tions concerning the research study, please contact the research team at 480-
420-8250. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this
research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair
of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU, at 480-
965-6788. Thank you for your participation. Goodbye.
During each procedure, the autodialer was configured to collect the following inputs
from the recipient:
Continued
Whether the recipient pressed 1 during or shortly after the scenario announcement message
is played.
Entered SSN
Whether the recipient pressed any digit during or shortly after the follow-up announcement
message is played.
Convinced
Whether the recipient pressed 1 stating that they were convinced to enter the last four digits
of their SSN during or shortly after the first survey question is played.
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Unconvinced
Whether the recipient pressed 0 stating that they were not convinced to enter the last four
digits of their SSN during or shortly after the first survey question is played.
Recording
The recipient’s recorded voice response for the second survey question.
3.2.5 Ethical Compliance
To address the ethical issues our experiments, we worked with our university’s IRB
to obtain approval for this experiment. We strove to design the experiments ethically to
protect the subjects as much as possible. To do so, we implemented several safeguards in
the experimental design to minimize the harm to participants.
The nature of this experiment, studying telephone phishing attacks, involves deception
as well as involuntary participation. Both aspects are critical to receiving scientifically
valid results—informing the participants of the study would significantly bias the results.
However, the use of deception could result in complaints and negative reactions from our
recipients. Before proceeding with the experiment, we also worked with our university’s
IT security group to provide them with the information that would help to alleviate the
concerns our participants. This IT security group at ASU is responsible for the security of
all aspects of the university. We shared with the security group the experiment contact list,
the experimental design, and the incoming phone numbers so that the help desk personnel
could be prepared to handle the requests and reports.
In recording the results, we also strive to do so ethically and in accordance with es-
tablished IRB protocols. One of the major safeguards is that we did not record the social
security number. While a spammer would typically want the social security number (or en-
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tire credit card number in different scam scenarios), all that is recorded is the fact that they
pressed any digit. To further reduce potential harm, we recorded very little meta informa-
tion from each call (each record is only the call time, call duration, answer state, and input
responses to the interactive system). This further reduces potential harm to the participants.
Although these measures may diminish the strength of our data, we believe ethics is a more
important aspect of designing a telephone phishing study.
3.2.6 Dissemination
We ran the previously described procedure using the 10 described experiments during
the work week of April 27th–31st of 2017, during core working hours of 10:00am–5:00pm
each day. We used an Internet-hosted autodialer to automate the process of sending out the
telephone calls to the 3,000 recipients. Each experiment’s calls were simultaneously dis-
tributed during the experiment period at a rate of no more than 3 live calls per experiment.
We associated each experiment with a unique caller ID. In all experiments, vast major-
ity of the outbound calls did not reach a live recipient and was answered by a voicemail
answering machine. Every ASU work phone had voicemail enabled by default and our
scenario announcement message would be recorded by the voicemail answering machine.
If a recipient could not answer the phone, the recipient could use the caller ID in their call
history to call us back. The recipient may also listen to the voicemail message left by the
scenario announcement message prior to calling back.
As each experiment had a unique caller ID, the return call would be directed to that
particular experiment’s procedure. When a recipient called back, the same procedure was
administered where a prerecorded scenario announcement message is first played. The
follow-up processes are also same as the outbound calling process with the same data col-
lected.
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While disseminating the phone calls, several unexpected events might have impacted
our study.
The ASU school of journalism and mass communication identified the scam call in-
cidents only 2:45 hours from the launch of the experiments on the first day. Instead of
reporting it to the university help desk (who were prepared and aware of our study), the
school sent out a mass email warning all journalism staffs and faculties at 4:28 hours from
launch.
At 4:22 hours from the launch of the experiments, our university’s telephone service
office also started blocking our phone calls as they were receiving system alerts of too
many incoming phone calls exhausting the telephone trunk routes. We managed to work
with the telephone service office to get our calls unblocked within the next 4 hours as we
dialed down the simultaneous call rate of our phone calls to 1 per experiment.
Meanwhile, the IRB office also received some complaints regarding the scam call ex-
periments, which resulted in the experiments being paused for roughly 12 hours on the third
day since launch, as we waited for the IRB committee to review and allow us to proceed
with the experiments.
In the end, despite the unexpected events, we finished sending out the telephone calls
to the 3,000 recipients as planned before the end of the work week.
3.3 Results and Analysis
The goal of this section is to present the results and provide a methodology of analyzing
the results. We apply the methodology to the results from the 3,000 phishing calls and
provide a discussion on the outcomes of the study.
After running the experiment for a work week, the results were collected from the 3,000
phishing calls. The input data collected from the recipients are presented in Table 3.2.
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No. Continued Entered SSN Convinced Recordings Unconvinced Recordings
E1 12 4.00% 6 2.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 4 1.33% 2 0.67%
E2 19 6.33% 15 5.00% 3 1.00% 0 0.00% 3 1.00% 3 1.00%
E3 13 4.33% 8 2.67% 1 0.33% 1 0.33% 2 0.67% 1 0.33%
E4 23 7.67% 13 4.33% 2 0.67% 0 0.00% 3 1.00% 2 0.67%
E5 9 3.00% 2 0.67% 1 0.33% 0 0.00% 1 0.33% 1 0.33%
E6 9 3.00% 8 2.67% 2 0.67% 2 0.67% 2 0.67% 1 0.33%
E7 13 4.33% 9 3.00% 3 1.00% 1 0.33% 5 1.67% 4 1.33%
E8 53 17.67% 30 10.00% 8 2.67% 3 1.00% 9 3.00% 8 2.67%
E9 60 20.00% 35 11.67% 7 2.33% 3 1.00% 4 1.33% 3 1.00%
E10 45 15.00% 22 7.33% 8 2.67% 7 2.33% 4 1.33% 2 0.67%
Total 256 8.53% 148 4.93% 35 1.17% 17 0.57% 37 1.23% 27 0.90%
Table 3.2: Summary of Recipient Inputs from All Experiments
Across all 10 experiments of 3,000 total recipients, we had 8.53% (256/3000) of all
recipients continued after listening to the scam scenario announcement, 4.93% (148/3000)
of all recipients entered at a digit when requested to enter the last four digits of their social
security number, 1.17% (35/3000) of all recipients explicitly stated that they were con-
vinced by the scam, and 1.23% (27/3000) of all recipients explicitly stated that they were
not convinced by the scam.
Before presenting our analysis of the experiments, we provide a discussion on the de-
velopment of our methodology to systematically analyze their relative effectiveness.
The first step of performing the analysis is to decide on a set of good metric(s) that will
be used for as the standard of measurement. To chose an ideal metric, we believe a good
metric should not only be quantifiable but also be a proxy for what ultimately matters. From
the telephone scammers’ perspective, we understand what matters to them is to collect as
many social security numbers as possible for the purpose of conducting identity fraud. Due
to the ethical considerations discussed in the previous section, we could not to directly
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collect and verify the recipients’ social security numbers. Therefore, we need to derive a
metric that could provide us with a reasonable estimate of the actual number of real SSNs
given to us in each experiment. This is how we arrived at that metric:
Continued
This is the total number of instances where digit 1 was pressed during or shortly after
the scenario announcement is played. After listening to the scenario announcement, the
recipient would be interested in getting more information about the scenario by pressing 1.
This metric could help to infer the effectiveness of the experiment. However, there is still a
possibility that the recipient may continue after the scenario announcement and not fall for
the scam.
Entered SSN
Because there is still a possibility that the recipients continue after the scenario announce-
ment and not provided the last 4 digits of their SSNs, we could use the total number of
instances where a digit was pressed shortly after the follow-up announcement. At this
point, the recipients would have already listened to the scenario announcement, pressed 1,
listened to the follow-up announcement, and then would have probably tried to enter the
last four digits of their social security number. Although this seems like an idea metric to
estimate the number of SSNs collected, however, there is still a possibility that the recipi-
ent may have tried to enter a fake social security number. In some of the recordings, a few
recipients stated that they did not enter their real social security number information.
Convinced
This is the number of recipients that explicitly stated that they were convinced by the scam
after the first survey question. At this point, the recipients would have already listened
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to the scenario announcement, pressed 1, listened to the follow-up announcement, and
then would have probably tried to enter the last four digits of their social security number,
then listened to the debriefing announcement, pressed 1, then listened to the first survey
question, and then pressed 1. This metric would be most conservative for estimating attack
success. However, looking at the low number of responses, participants rarely made it to
that step. People are generally not inclined to stay on a robocall for too long. Using this
metric would exclude a large number of recipients that fell for the scam but declined to
participate in the phone survey after the debriefing announcement.
Possibly Tricked
Since we cannot assume that all SSNs entered were real, to reduce these types of false
positives, we could remove the participants that entered their SSNs and then subsequently
stated that they were unconvinced by then scam during the survey process. This number,
which we call Possibly Tricked, provides a more reasonable estimate of the actual number
of recipients that fell for the scam by entering the last four digits of their social security
number. Compared to the previous metrics, this metric provides a good balance of conser-
vativeness and sample size, therefore, we decided on using this metric for our analysis.
Table 3.3 presents a table of the number of possibly tricked recipients for each ex-
periment, ranked from most successful to least successful. Comparing the tricked result
between experiments, experiment E9 had the highest tricked rate among all experiments,
with an estimate of 10.33% (31/300) of recipients tricked into entering the last four digits
of their social security number. On the other hand, experiment 5 had the lowest success rate
among all experiments, with an estimate of only 0.33% (1/300) of recipients tricked into
entering the last four digits of their social security number. At a glance, the ASU scams
performed distinctly better than the IRS scams as they took the top 3 spots on our list.
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No. Entered SSN Unconvinced Possibly Tricked
E9 35 4 31 10.33%
E8 30 9 21 7.00%
E10 22 4 18 6.00%
E2 15 3 12 4.00%
E4 13 3 10 3.33%
E3 8 2 6 2.00%
E6 8 2 6 2.00%
E7 9 6 3 1.00%
E1 6 4 2 0.67%
E5 2 1 1 0.33%
Total 148 37 111 3.70%
Table 3.3: Estimating the Number of Recipients Tricked into Entering Their Real SSN
Information
The next step for us is to decide on an appropriate method of data analysis on the chosen
metric.
With a myriad of possible data analysis methods, model-based analysis, such as re-
gression, Bayesian, and machine-learning models, is one category of the methods we con-
sidered using. Model-based analysis can produce a model that describes an optimal map-
ping of attribute properties to the results. However, such methods often achieve optimality
through an ideal combination of parameters, which tend to overfit the spurious correlations
that occur in our training data. Looking at the training data, it would be hard to construct a
trick success rate model based on the attribute properties without overfitting as it is a Small
Data problem [53].
Therefore, we ultimately decided on using statistical hypothesis testing approaches for
analysis, as it is a more suitable analysis technique in this situation. Statistical hypoth-
esis testing also has the added benefit of providing more comprehensible answers to the
questions that matter. The goal of our study to perform analysis such that the knowledge
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extracted from the data can be discussed in relevance to the real world, not our training
data.
To begin using statistical hypothesis testing approaches, we asked, “what are the hy-
pothesis questions that our data can provide an answer for?” We will provide a discussion
on the hypothesis questions we decided to ask and how we applied a data analysis method
to provide a contextual answer to the hypothesis questions.
Can manipulating the area code have a significant effect on the attack success of a
telephone scam?
In the real world, we observed telephone scammers used area code manipulation in
many instances. To provide an answer to this question, we can compare the number of
possibly tricked between similar experiments that used different area codes, i.e. E1, E2,
and E3. We see that E1 had 0.67% possibly tricked, E2 had 4% possibly tricked, and E3
had 2% possibly tricked. In our question concerning the significance of area code, since E1
and E2 have the greatest difference in the number of possibly tricked precipitants, we test
if using toll-free area code is significantly more effective than Washington, DC area code
in the context of the IRS scam example. So we perform a right-tailed p-value statistical
hypothesis testing approach on the chosen experiment groups.
The use of right-tailed p-value approach in statistical hypothesis testing is a way to
answer if assuming the null hypothesis is true whether the improved alternative hypothesis
is “likely” in the direction of the alternative hypothesis. With regards to the choice of using
Bayesian vs Frequentist methods, since there no past knowledge of similar experiments
conducted, we can only use Frequentist methods to calculate the statistical significance on
the underlying truths using only data from the current experiment. In addition, not only do
we want to know if the improvement to attack success is significant, it is also important to
know the magnitude of improvement. To avoid making statements like “E2 is 5 times more
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effective than E1”, instead of measuring the relative difference, we calculated Cohen’s d to
measure the effect size for comparison between the two groups.
Using the right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 2.721 and a p-value of
0.0033. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is very likely that
using toll-free area code can result in a more successful attack than using than Washington,
DC area code in the context of the IRS scam example. The two groups also have a Cohen’s
d of 0.222, which suggests it has a small effect according to Cohen [54] and has a somewhat
educationally significant effect according to Wolf [55]. Therefore, we could say that the
area code can have a significant effect on the attack success of telephone phishing scam.
Can manipulating the type of voice production have a significant effect on the attack
success of a telephone scam?
In the scam samples collected, we heard many scammers used a synthesized voice and
some others used recorded human voice. To provide an answer to this question, we can
compare the number of possibly tricked between similar experiments that used different
types of voice production, i.e. E1 and E6. In our question concerning the significance of
voice production, we test if using recorded human voice is significantly more effective than
using synthesized voice in the context of the IRS scam example.
Using the same right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 1.426 and a p-value
of 0.0769. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is unlikely that
using recorded human voice can result in a more successful attack than using than using
synthesized voice in the context of the IRS scam example. The two groups have a Cohen’s d
of 0.117, which also suggests the effect size is very small and not educationally significant.
Therefore, we are not able to conclude at this time if the type of voice production had a
significant effect on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam.
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Can manipulating the voice gender have a significant effect on the attack success of a
telephone scam?
For the telephone scammer, the voice gender of the voice synthesizer can be easily
changed with a simple option click in the autodialer. To provide an answer to this question,
we compare the number of possibly tricked between similar experiments that used different
voice genders, i.e. E1 and E4. In our question concerning the significance of voice gender,
we test if using a female synthesized voice is significantly more effective than using male
synthesized voice in the context of the IRS scam example.
Using the same right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 2.343 and a p-
value of 0.00955. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is likely
that using a female synthesized voice can result in a more successful attack than using
a male synthesized voice in the context of the IRS scam example. The two groups have a
Cohen’s d of 0.192, which suggests the effect size is small and not educationally significant.
Therefore, it is hard for us to conclude at this time if the voice gender has a significant effect
on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam.
Can manipulating the voice accent have a significant effect on the attack success of a
telephone scam?
In the IRS scam samples, many spoke with an Indian accent while some spoke with
an American accent. To provide an answer to this question, we compare the number of
possibly tricked between similar experiments that used different accents, i.e. E6 and E7.
In our question concerning the significance of voice accent, we test if speaking with an
American accent is significantly more effective than speaking with an Indian accent in the
context of the IRS scam example.
Using the same right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 1.008 and a p-value
of 0.157. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is unlikely that
speaking with an American accent can result in a more successful attack than speaking
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with an Indian accent in the context of the IRS scam example. The two groups also have
a Cohen’s d of 0.082, which suggests the effect size is very small and not educationally
significant. Therefore, we are not able to conclude at this time if the voice accent had a
significant effect on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam.
Can spoofing a known caller name have a significant effect on the attack success of a
telephone scam?
In the real world, we observed telephone scammers spoofing a known caller name in
some instances, especially in targeted attacks. To provide an answer to this question, we
compare the number of possibly tricked between similar experiments that has a difference
in the display of a caller name, i.e. E8 and E9. In our question concerning the significance
of spoofing caller name, we test if displaying a HR-department like caller name “W-2
Administration” is more effective than not displaying a caller name in the context of the
HR scam example.
Using the same right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 1.454 and a p-value
of 0.0730. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is unlikely that
displaying a HR-department like caller name can result in a more successful attack than
displaying a caller name in the context of the HR scam example. The two groups also have
a Cohen’s d of 0.119, which suggests the effect size is very small and not educationally
significant. Therefore, we are not able to conclude at this time if spoofing a known caller
name had a significant effect on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam.
Can impersonating an internal entity have a significant effect on the attack success of
a telephone scam?
With any form of spear phishing, it involves impersonating an internal entity that the
recipient is familiar with. The scammer then has to create a scenario that is tailored to the
entity, as the “Entity” cannot be set independently from “Scenario”. To provide an answer
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to the hypothesis question, we compare the number of possibly tricked between similar
experiments that used different entity-scenarios, i.e. comparing E1 and E5 with E8 and
E10. In our question concerning the significance of impersonating an internal entity, we
test if impersonating the HR department using the name “W-2 Administration” is more
effective than impersonating the IRS with the context of the scenarios tested.
Using the same right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 5.732 and a p-value
of 4.97E-9. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is likely that
impersonating the HR department using the name “W-2 Administration” can result in a
more successful attack than impersonating the IRS with the context of the scenarios tested.
The two groups also have a Cohen’s d of 0.331, which suggests the effect size is small and
educationally significant. Therefore, we could say that impersonating an internal entity had
a significant effect on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam.
Can manipulating the type of motivation have a significant effect on the attack success
of a telephone scam?
To motivate recipient into taking some harmful action, the scammer could either use
fear or reward. To provide an answer to the hypothesis question, we compare the number
of possibly tricked between similar experiments that used different types of motivation, i.e.
comparing E1 and E8 with E5 and E10. In our question concerning the significance of the
type of motivation, we test if fear-based scenarios are more effective than reward-based
scenarios the context of the entities tested.
Using the same right-tailed p-value approach, we have a Z-score of 0.628 and a p-value
of 0.265. Using an arbitrary confidence level of 95% (p-value < 0.05), it is unlikely that
fear-based scenarios can result in a more successful attack than reward-based scenarios with
the context of the entities tested. The two groups also have a Cohen’s d of 0.036, which
suggests the effect size is very small and not educationally significant. Therefore, we are
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Hypothesis Group A
Possibly
Tricked
Group B
Possibly
Tricked
p-value
Significant
(p <
0.05)
Cohen’s
d
Effect Size Conclusive
Can manipulating the area
code have a significant effect
on the attack success of a tele-
phone scam?
E1 2/300 E2 12/300 0.0033 Yes 0.222
Small &
somewhat
educationally
significant
Somewhat
Can manipulating the type of
voice production have a sig-
nificant effect on the attack
success of a telephone scam?
E1 2/300 E6 6/300 0.0769 No 0.117
Very small &
not education-
ally significant
No
Can manipulating the voice
gender have a significant ef-
fect on the attack success of a
telephone scam?
E1 2/300 E4 10/300 0.00955 Yes 0.192
Small & not
educationally
significant
Hardly
Can manipulating the voice
accent have a significant ef-
fect on the attack success of
a telephone scam?
E7 3/300 E6 6/300 0.157 No 0.082
Very small &
not education-
ally significant
No
Can spoofing a known caller
name have a significant effect
on the attack success of a tele-
phone scam?
E8 21/300 E9 31/300 0.073 No 0.119
Very small &
not education-
ally significant
No
Can impersonating an inter-
nal entity have a significant
effect on the attack success of
a telephone scam?
E1 + E5 3/600 E8 + E9 39/600 4.97E-9 Yes 0.331
Small & edu-
cationally sig-
nificant
Yes
Can manipulating the type of
motivation have a significant
effect on the attack success of
a telephone scam?
E5 + E10 19/600 E1 + E8 23/600 0.265 No 0.036
Very small &
not education-
ally significant
No
Table 3.4: Summary of Statistical Hypothesis Testing Results
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not able to conclude at this time if manipulating the type of motivation had a significant
effect on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam.
Summary
The summary of our statistical hypothesis testing results are shown in Table 3.4. Based
on the statistical hypothesis results, we found that impersonating an internal entity had the
most significant effect on the attack success of a telephone phishing scam. We also found
that manipulating the area code (using toll-free area) can have a somewhat significant effect.
On the contrary, manipulating the type of motivation, voice production, voice accent, and
caller name, individually had an insignificant effect on the attack success. It is also hard for
us to conclude whether manipulating the voice gender have a significant effect even though
the result was statistically significant.
3.4 Survey Responses
In this section, we discuss the recorded survey responses that asked the participants
for the reasons they were convinced or unconvinced to enter the last four digits of their
social security number. We listened to all 44 recorded voice responses and summarized the
responses in Table 3.5.
Based on the limited number of voice responses from the survey respondents (1.4%,
or 44/3,000), no one provided an explicit voice response on why they were convinced by
the IRS scams. The four recordings we received were either silent or contained no useful
information. In general, participants were less willing to report the reasons why they were
convinced by the scam after they were explicitly told that they had fallen victim to an attack.
On why the IRS scams were unconvincing, most of the survey respondents stated that
they already knew that the IRS would not make a call like this or that they were already
vigilant about IRS scam calls. This is understandable because there are numerous media
reports about the IRS scams, and the IRS posted many public warnings on not to trust these
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No. Reasons Convinced Reasons Unconvinced
E1
Would never enter SSN on incoming call; No
name mentioned for the charge
E2
IRS won’t make a call like this (x2); Already
aware of scams like this
E3 IRS won’t make a call like this
E4
IRS won’t make a call like this; Didn’t sound
legitimate
E5 IRS won’t make a call like this
E6
IRS won’t make a call like this; Already
aware of scams like this
E7
IRS won’t make a call like this (x4); Indian
accent (x2)
E8
To get paid (x2); Sounded legitimate;
Trusted work phone; Only asked for last 4
SSN; Caller ID showed local ASU number
ASU won’t make a call like this (x5); Not
from ASU number (x2); Synthetic voice;
E9
Sounded legitimate; Only asked for last 4
SSN; Caller ID showed ASU W-2
Should have asked for complete SSN (x2);
Would never enter SSN on incoming call
E10
To get bonus (x2); Trusted work phone;
From ASU number; Asked to do so
ASU won’t make a call like this; Not ASU
number
Table 3.5: Summary of Recorded Survey Responses
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types of scams. This further supports the hypothesis that the impersonated identity and the
corresponding scenario was the most significant factor. Interestingly, in experiment E7,
two respondents mentioned that the Indian accent was also one of the reasons they were
unconvinced.
The ASU phishing scams had more survey responses. On why the ASU scams con-
vinced them, most of the survey respondents described something related to the scam sce-
nario, which means that the impersonated entity and the scenario were the key factors.
Three respondents also believe that the caller ID was from ASU and stated caller ID was
one of the reasons they believed in the scam, even though none of the caller IDs were
actually from ASU.
On why the ASU scams did not convince them, most of the survey respondents de-
scribed that they were quite certain that ASU would not make a call like this or they were
already vigilant about giving their SSN information over an incoming call. Interestingly,
two respondents mentioned that the scenario only asked for the last four digits of their SSN,
and should have asked for their complete SSN if it was really payroll related, which quite
possibly meant that those two might have given out their complete SSNs if the phishing
scam had asked for it. The external caller ID and synthetic voice were also mentioned for
being one of the factors that made the survey respondents suspicious.
3.5 Limitations
The experiments were conducted in a university setting where the recipients are uni-
versity staffs and faculties. The demographics of the recipients in our study is not a repre-
sentative sample of the general population of telephone users in the US. It is possible that
general population of telephone users in the US have different tricked rates than university
staffs and faculties. We suspect that the general population would be more susceptible to
telephone phishing scams than the population tested in our experiments, as all ASU staffs
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and faculties were required to take information security awareness training within the first
month of employment and annually thereafter. However, our study would not pass IRB
approval or would have required explicit permissions if it was conducted on the general
population.
The experiments only sent out calls to a specific brand of work phones. The type of
phone in our study is not a representative sample of the entire population of telephones in
the US. The vast majority of the telephones are mobile phones and it is possible that these
have a different tricked rates than work phones. We suspect that the mobile phones have a
higher answering rates and therefore would have a higher rate of attack success compared
to work phones. However, personal cell phone numbers are considered residential property
and our study would not pass IRB approval or would have required explicit permissions if
it was conducted on mobile telephones.
The experiments only collected SSN information based on estimates. The experiments
had several safeguards and the process was tightly regulated to ensure risks to the human
research subjects were minimized. This prevented us from collecting any actual social
security numbers from the recipients. We suspect that collecting actual social security
numbers would have strengthened the results of our study. However, our study would not
pass IRB approval or would have required explicit permissions if it was designed to collect
social security numbers.
In the real world, there are infinite ways a telephone scam could be constructed. Our
study, at best, shines a slither of light on the universe of all possibilities. We designed our
scam experiments based on some popular telephone scams being reported to government
and user websites, but there are some other possible scams that we have not yet covered.
At this time, our study focused on attributes and scams that we presented in this chapter.
The study of other possible attributes and scams is what we could do in a future work.
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3.6 Discussion
Our experiments have shown that automated telephone phishing attacks can be effec-
tive. One experiment, E9, which simulated a targeted phishing attack with caller name
spoofing, achieved a 10.33% tricked rate, where recipients possibly divulged the last four
digits of their social security numbers.
We have also validated some potential key attributes that can have a significant effect on
the scam effectiveness, i.e., impersonating an internal entity and announcing a relevant sce-
nario. Manipulating the caller ID to a toll-free area code may also somewhat improve the
scam effectiveness. Other attribute properties such as human voice, female voice, Ameri-
can accent, caller name spoofing, fear-based scenario also improved the scam effectiveness
in our empirical study, however, at this time we are not able to conclusively prove that
they have a significant effect. Nonetheless, given how easy it is for a scammer to manip-
ulate all these attributes, a scammer would seek to incorporate all attribute properties that
made an improvement to the attack success, i.e. a phishing scam with toll-free area code,
spoofing known a caller name, speaking in a recorded human, female voice, in American
accent, impersonating an internal entity, motivating the recipient with a relevant fear-based
scenario.
Our process of designing the phishing scams and disseminating the scam calls have also
shown that this type of massively scalable phishing attack can be carried out with little bar-
riers to entry: A scammer can compile a recipient list from a company’s publicly available
telephone directory; The voice announcement can be recorded easily with a text-to-speech
synthesizer or by recording a human voice; A convincing scam scenario can be crafted by
researching the company’s departments; The caller IDs are easily bought or spoofed with
an Internet-hosted service provider; The scam calls can be distributed cheaply and auto-
matically with an autodialer. Furthermore, the Internet provides plenty of opportunities to
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avoid legal repercussions. Hence, this user study is a reminder that telephone scam is a
technically and economically viable operation, which provides evidence as to their rise in
popularity.
To prevent falling victim to these types of phishing scams, we believe that the key is to
target and prevent impersonation. Our statistical results have shown that impersonating an
internal entity had a significant effect on the scam effectiveness. To address the imperson-
ation issue, feedback from our survey participants suggest that vigilance was an important
reason for not falling for a scam. Many surveyed subjects expressed distrust towards our
scam calls when they were already vigilant about the scam scenario. It is possible that
the information from existing scam reports and the security awareness training could have
helped the subjects stay vigilant against the phishing calls. Therefore, we recommend ed-
ucation and awareness of telephone phishing as a countermeasure. On technical solutions,
we recommend a similar approach to help the subjects stay vigilant against the phishing
calls. There are solutions that can provide early warnings against impersonated calls, such
as, caller ID authentication [56–58], which has strong safeguards against caller ID imper-
sonation and could help to warn the users against malicious calls with a reputation system.
3.7 Related Work
We have not found prior empirical user studies on telephone phishing. The only similar
work we found was by Aburrous et al., who performed a phone phishing experiment on a
group of 50 employees contacted by female colleagues assigned to lure them into giving
away their personal e-banking usernames and passwords. They were able to deceive 32%
of the employees to give out their e-banking credentials [59]. However, in the experiment,
the 50 employees already knew the female colleagues that contacted them, which suggests
that this is more of an experiment studying an insider attack rather than an impersonation
attack.
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Other related works studied phishing using different channels. Dhamija et al. performed
a website phishing study on 22 university participants and their best phishing site was able
to fool more than 90% of participants [60]. Egelman et al. performed an email and website
phishing experiment on 60 in-person participants to test the effectiveness of various web
browser phishing warnings at that time, and it was found that 79% of Internet Explorer 7.0
participants heeded the active phishing warnings and only 13% of them obeyed the passive
warnings [61]. Jagatic et al. performed a social media spear phishing study on 481 targeted
Indiana University student emails obtained by crawling social network websites and it had
a 72% success rate of recipients authenticating themselves on a redirected website [62].
Vidas et al. performed a QR code phishing study where the experiment distributed 139
posters containing QR codes at various locations at Carnegie Mellon University and the
city of Pittsburgh, the experiment was able to trick 225 individuals to visit the associated
website in four weeks [63].
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented the methodology, design, execution, results, analysis, and evalu-
ation in the quest of answering why telephone phishing works. The methodology involved
first taxonomizing the visual and voice attributes of telephone phishing scams, and then
developing a systematized approach designed to test if each attribute has a significant ef-
fect on the success of the scam. The study was executed using 10 experiments simulating
telephone phishing attacks, administered to 3,000 works phones of university staffs and
faculties over the course of a work week. The results were collected from the inputs and
survey responses of the phone recipients. We analyzed the results by performing statistical
hypothesis testing methods on a chosen metric derived from the inputs and we were able
to identify at least one attribute that had a significant effect. We provided a discussion on
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how to effectively prevent such types of telephone phishing scams, and we believe that the
best countermeasures should target impersonation and instill vigilance.
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Chapter 4
IDENTIFYING KEY CHALLENGES AND EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES
With an understanding of why telephone scams work from the previous chapter, the
question we ask is: what are the existing defenses against spam and scam calls? Given the
significant gains made in reducing email spam, this raises the question: are there any simple
and effective solutions that could stop telephone spam? Unfortunately, we found that this
issue is not easily solved as there are unique challenges in the telephone ecosystem that
require novel approaches. Many existing solutions have failed to overcome these challenges
and, as a result, have yet to be widely implemented. In this chapter, we will present a
survey of the key challenges in dealing with telephone spam and the existing telephone
spam countermeasures. With such understandings, we derive a set of evaluation criteria
that we use to analyze the failings of the current techniques and present the metrics that are
critical to an acceptable solution. We believe that this work will help guide the development
of effective telephone spam defenses, as well as provide a framework to evaluate future
defenses.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We describe the challenges in reducing telephone spam, describing the technical and
regulatory challenges that make telephone spam distinct from email spam.
• We develop a taxonomy that classifies the existing anti-spam techniques into three
categories, providing a high-level view of the benefits and drawbacks of each type of
technique.
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• We provide a systematization of assessment criteria for evaluating telephone spam
countermeasures, and we evaluate existing techniques using these assessment crite-
ria.
• We provide a discussion on why we believe in stopping caller ID spoofing to be the
best direction of solving the telephone spam problem.
This chapter contains work published in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2016 [45].
4.1 Key Challenges
Before diving into the various anti-spam techniques and countermeasures to prevent
telephone spam, it is important to first discuss the challenges and constraints in combating
telephone spam to understand how it affect the design of a countermeasure.
We identify several challenges in combating telephone spam—that are significantly
different from email spam—some of which are technical and some of which are regulatory.
4.1.1 Immediacy Constraint
Unlike email, which can be queued for later analysis, a voice call has an immediacy
constraint. A telephone call request is immediate and therefore must be analyzed as soon
as it appears, and the telephone anti-spam system must complete analysis and take action
within a short window of time to reduce the delay. If a solution adds too much delay to a
call request, the legitimate caller may assume that the recipient could not answer the phone
and hang up.
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4.1.2 Difficulty of Working with Audio Streams
The content of a voice call is difficult to parse and analyze: the content is an audio
stream as opposed to the text of an email. To make matters worse, the content of a voice
call is only revealed when the call is answered, and both the caller and the recipient will be
affected if an anti-spam system answers the call. Whereas an email anti-spam system can
easily analyze the content of an email, and neither the sender nor the receiver is affected.
4.1.3 Lack of Useful Header Data
Voice calls lack the rich header data of email. When a call arrives at the recipient, it
contains little useful header information. When a phone call arrives at the recipient, usually
the only useful information available to the recipient is the caller ID. An email header,
however, has well-defined and information-rich SMTP headers—before the content of the
email. It is also difficult to omit the sender’s IP address and the domain name of the email.
This is in stark contrast to a call request header, where the header data is easily omittable
by a spammer.
4.1.4 Hard to Gain User Acceptance
The bar for user acceptance of a telephone spam countermeasure is much higher com-
pared to email. Consumers, rightly, have a very low tolerance for false positives of blocked
calls. Phone call tends to be more urgent and important compared the email, and once a
phone call is wrongfully blocked it could have severe consequences.
4.1.5 Caller ID Spoofing
The Caller ID service is an information service that provides the recipient with infor-
mation of the caller before answering the phone, which could be useful for blocking spam
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calls. However, caller ID fundamentally has no authentication mechanism and is easily
spoofed. The only security mechanism comes from having the TSP send the caller ID on
behalf of the caller. This security mechanism is eroded when the spammer subscribes to
a telephone service that allows customization of caller IDs. With the rise of VoIP services
that provide features such as caller ID customization over the Internet, it is trivial for any
caller to cheaply and effectively spoof the caller ID. Thus, any telephone spam defense
technique that relies on the caller ID is now vulnerable to caller ID spoofing.
4.1.6 Difficulty of Tracing Spam Calls
One way to combat spam is to make it illegal and enforce those laws. In the his-
tory of email spam, a small number of players were responsible for the majority of the
spam, hence taking action against these big targets resulted in significant drops in spam
volume. For instance, shutting down the Rustock botnet reduced global spam levels by
around 40% [64]. It is reasonable to assume a similar distribution of telephone spammers.
Unfortunately, identifying the actual distribution of telephone spammers is difficult due to
the technical and regulatory challenges of monitoring PSTN traffic and the prevalence of
caller ID spoofing.
It is difficult to locate the true origin of a call after it has been initiated. PSTN calls are
designed to work on the principle of forwarding tables and circuit switching. Each time a
call is placed, only the destination number is used for routing. It works by establishing in-
dividual circuits down a sequence of neighboring switches until it ends up at the recipient’s
terminal. The outbound switch(es) do not necessarily need to know whether the optional
caller ID number in the call request header would route back to the caller’s terminal. If
the outbound switch also serves as the caller’s inbound switch, then the TSP could perhaps
verify the true owner of the caller ID number from its own records. However, the TSPs do
not have a legal obligation to perform any verification, or to share that information with the
68
recipient, thus, without the cooperation of the caller’s TSP, tracing a spam call is almost
impossible.
To make matters worse, as spam calls can now be initiated over the Internet, a spammer
can further hide behind proxies, VPNs, or Tor networks, or even distribute outbound calls
using a botnet, adding even more difficulty in tracing the exact whereabouts of a spammer.
4.1.7 Entrenched Legacy Systems
The PSTN ecosystem has been around for several decades, allowing any phone to reach
any other phone through a vast interconnection of switching centers. While the core net-
works have evolved to be almost entirely carried by an IP-based infrastructure, the signaling
protocols have not changed (to ensure legacy compatibility). Even though VoIP is touted
as a major revolution of voice communication, the legacy of PSTN protocols will remain
for many years to come. Change is difficult when the entire ecosystem must ensure that the
majority of legacy systems will work, and therefore wholesale replacement of the core tele-
phony system is a nonstarter. As a result, telephone spammers can exploit the weaknesses
in the legacy technology (such as the lack of caller ID verification) to run a successful
spamming operation.
4.1.8 Lack of Effective Regulations
Unfortunately, there is also a lack of incentive for the industry to participate in the anti-
spam effort. Unlike email and Internet traffic where the peering model [38] incentivizes
the Internet service providers to reduce the load of spam traffic on their systems, telephony
service providers profit from the spam-generated traffic and intercarrier compensation fees.
Most players (phone number collectors, lead sellers, telephony service providers, and back-
bone carriers) in the PSTN ecosystem profit from telephone spam, except the consumer.
Although TSPs may benefit in other ways by reducing telephone spam (for instance, in
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better public relations or charging spam-filtering service as a fee), there exists, at least, a
minor monetary disincentive.
Further complicating matters, the current United States law ensure that TSPs are im-
mune from liability for servicing spam calls [65] under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, which means that they cannot be held liable for servicing spam calls. Clas-
sified as common carriers, TSPs have an obligation to move all phone traffic with no ex-
ceptions [66]. Therefore, it is difficult to implement anti-spam solutions at the most natural
place: the TSP who has a direct view of the telephony network.
4.1.9 Lack of Globalized Enforcement
In the United States, a number of laws and regulation exist at both the federal and state
levels, such as making robocalling illegal (with some exemptions) [12], making caller ID
spoofing illegal (with some exemptions) [67], and the establishment of a national Do-Not-
Call Registry [68]. The FTC is also interested in stopping telephone spam, and they have
held numerous competitions to combat robocalling [69]. Despite resolute efforts by the US
government, robocalling and caller ID spoofing is still an unsolved problem. Technology
and globalization have resulted in telephony networks shifting from a national ecosystem
to a global ecosystem. With the use of VoIP service, a telephone spammer can cheaply
distribute outbound calls from an overseas location. Because the spammers lie beyond the
jurisdiction of US law enforcement authorities, it is hard for law enforcement to prosecute
those spammers for breaking the law. Effective control of telephone spam would require
cross-border enforcement. However, cross-border jurisdiction of telephone spam has yet
to catch up with the present technology, and many countries would have no incentive to
cooperate with US regulatory and enforcement agencies.
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4.2 Basic Techniques and Countermeasures
There are various anti-spam techniques are used to prevent telephone spam. To iden-
tify the state-of-the-art in preventing telephone spam, we gathered existing techniques from
academic, industry, SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT), and Internet domain. The tech-
niques can be systematically grouped into the following classes: (1) Call Request Header
Analysis, (2) Voice Interactive Screening, and (3) Caller Compliance.
4.2.1 Call Request Header Analysis
Call Request Header Analysis is a category of techniques that filters calls based on the
header information associated with the call request. For instance, the caller ID is a popular
type of request header information that can be used to analyze a call. The effectiveness of
Call Request Header Analysis depends on the accuracy of the information collected, which
could be severely impacted when spoofing or omission is possible.
Caller ID Blacklisting rejects a call if the caller’s phone number (captured from caller ID
or Automatic Number Identification service) appears on a blacklist, otherwise, calls from
all other phone numbers are accepted. This can be used to block spam calls by blacklisting
phone numbers that are known to be spamming, and the recipient’s terminal would silently
block all phone calls from those phone numbers without disturbing the recipient. Caller
ID Blacklisting only blocks phone numbers that are explicitly added to a blacklist, hence
it tends to be permissive to all other callers. As caller ID service has become ubiquitous
in all telephone services, Caller ID Blacklisting does not face compatibility issues. Caller
ID Blacklisting is easy to implement and requires very little computational resources, and
it is a common feature in modern smartphones[70, 71]. However, a blacklist must be well
populated to be effective against spam, therefore compiling a comprehensive list would not
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be scalable for the recipient. A spammer could defeat Caller ID Blacklisting by spoofing
any number not known to be blacklisted, hence it is not effective against most forms of call
request header manipulation.
Caller ID Whitelisting only accepts calls from phone numbers that appear on a whitelist,
otherwise, calls from all other phone numbers are rejected. This can be used to block spam
calls by whitelisting phone numbers that are known to be trusted, and the recipient’s termi-
nal would silently block phone calls from all other phone numbers without disturbing the
recipient. Caller ID Whitelisting is easy to implement and requires very little resources, and
it is easy to find implementations on modern smartphones[72, 73]. Caller ID Whitelisting
blocks all calls that are not added to a whitelist, and does not need to be well populated
to be effective against spam, hence it is quite scalable for the recipient when defending
against spam. It is usually quite easy to populate a whitelist, as the numbers could be de-
rived from the recipient’s contacts list. However, unknown legitimate callers would always
get blocked in Caller ID Whitelisting. A spammer could defeat Caller ID Whitelisting by
spoofing the caller ID of a number known to be trusted by the recipient, however this is
more difficult without prior knowledge about the recipient’s whitelist.
Caller Reputation System uses reputation or trust associated with a caller’s phone number
to determine if the caller is a spammer. A Caller Reputation System maintains and pub-
lishes reputation scores associated with individual callers, in which the reputation scores
are computed based on various caller-related information such as recipient black/white-
lists [74–77], caller behavior [75, 78, 79], recipient behavior [74, 80, 81], caller’s domain
reputation [76, 82], social connections [80, 83–86], and recipient feedbacks [74, 75, 77, 82,
87, 88]. There are also many opportunities to improve a Caller Reputation System by devel-
oping better scoring algorithms. The Caller Reputation System can be used to filter spam
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calls by configuring the recipient’s terminal to block calls from callers associated with poor
reputation. A Caller Reputation System generally requires a large amount of data, which
are usually crowdsourced from many recipients, and the data would need to be curated by
an administrative third party. It would also require frequent maintenance to ensure quality
and freshness of data in order to be effective. However, large scale collection of personal
information could be at risk of violating privacy. Caller Reputation System could be vul-
nerable to Sybil attacks, where a malicious caller obtains multiple identities to gain a large
influence over its own (or other caller’s) reputation. Because the reputation of a caller is
associated with the caller’s phone number, a spammer could defeat the Caller Reputation
System by spoofing the caller ID to a number with a good reputation. A malicious caller
could also sabotage someone by deliberately making junk calls while spoofing the caller
ID number, such that the victim gets a poor reputation.
Caller Behavior Analysis uses the call behavioral features associated with a caller’s phone
number to determine if the caller is a spammer, using behavioral features such as call
count/velocity [75, 79, 85, 89–95], call duration sum/mean/variance [75, 85, 90–92, 94–
96], call rejection count/ratio [81, 85, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98], recipient diversity coun-
t/ratio [90, 91, 95, 98], invalid recipient count/ratio [85, 93–95, 97], repeated call coun-
t/ratio [91, 98], outbound-to-inbound ratio [79, 94, 97, 99, 100], simultaneous calls [92],
and caller’s domain behavior [78, 97]. There are also many opportunities to improve the
technique by developing better classification algorithms. Acquiring the caller’s behavioral
information usually requires participation from the caller’s telephony service provider or a
honeypot of telephones [79, 81]. If not required by regulation, it is usually not in the TSP’s
business interest to report on or impose a call behavior restriction on their callers. The
callers’ behavioral information would need to be updated frequently to ensure accuracy
and freshness in order to be effective. Large scale collection of callers’ call behavior could
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also face privacy issues and numerous obstacles from legal regulations. Because the call
behavior of a caller is associated with the caller’s phone number, a spammer could defeat
the Caller Reputation System by spoofing the caller ID to a number with good calling be-
havior. Furthermore, a spammer could hide its illegitimate call behaviors by using multiple
caller identities.
Device Fingerprinting collects a variety of metadata from the call request header for the
purpose of creating a device fingerprint of a caller’s terminal. Device fingerprinting im-
proves the accuracy of determining the caller’s identity by using only a set of information
that meets the properties of diversity and stability. Device Fingerprinting has been proposed
for SPIT prevention by blacklisting or whitelisting the device fingerprints of SIP-based ter-
minals [101]. However, in PSTN, device fingerprint information is a scarce resource. This
is due to the little amount of header information in PSTN call requests compared to SIP or
email, resulting in having too little workable information for device fingerprinting to work
effectively.
Caller ID Anomaly Detection searches for anomalous patterns in the caller ID, such as
invalid format, invalid number, unavailable number, toll-free number, area codes, regular
expression, to determine if the caller is a spammer. Caller ID Anomaly Detection is quite
easy to implement and requires very little computational resources and, therefore, is easy to
find in several call blocking apps [102, 103]. Caller ID Anomaly Detection does not track
information associated with any individual caller, instead, it looks for general patterns in
the caller ID that can be used to differentiate spammers and legitimate callers. As Caller ID
Anomaly Detection tend to find matches more broadly, it tends to be easier to manage and
maintain. However, some patterns may be potentially prone to false negatives, and there-
fore may restrict some legitimate callers, such as VoIP users or privacy enabled callers. A
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Description Decimal ASCII Hex
Message Type (MDMF) 128 80
Message Length 33 21
Parameter Code (Date & Time) 1 01
Parameter Length 8 08
Month (November) 49 1 31
49 1 31
Day (28) 50 2 32
56 8 38
Hour (3pm) 49 1 31
53 5 35
Minutes (43) 52 4 34
51 3 33
Parameter Code (CPN) 2 02
Parameter Length (10) 10 0A
From (6062241359) 54 6 36
48 0 30
54 6 36
50 2 32
50 2 32
52 4 34
49 1 31
51 3 33
53 5 35
57 9 39
Parameter Code (Name) 7 07
Parameter Length (9) 9 09
Name (Joe Smith) 74 J 4A
111 o 6F
101 e 65
32 20
83 S 53
109 m 6D
105 i 69
116 t 74
104 h 68
Checksum 88 58
Table 4.1: MDMF Message Sample in the Existing POTS Protocol
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spammer could defeat Caller ID Anomaly Detection by carefully crafting the caller ID to
not trigger any known anomalous patterns.
ANI-CPN Matching checks whether the Calling Party Number (CPN) captured by the
caller ID service matches with the Automatic Number Identification (ANI) number cap-
tured by the ANI service [104]. Automatic Number Identification service [105] is a separate
type of calling line identification service that can capture the calling number information
even when the caller ID is not presented. It was originally designed to obtain the call-
ing party’s billing number from a local exchange carrier to any interconnecting carrier for
billing of long distance calls. In most cases, the billing number is the same as the CPN, and
usually when a mismatch happens it is likely due to caller ID spoofing, or the caller is call-
ing from a private branch exchange (PBX). ANI-CPN Matching assumes that a legitimate
caller’s CPN matches the ANI number whereas a malicious caller would spoof the CPN
which results in a mismatch. However, ANI service are usually not made available to reg-
ular consumers (usually only offered to 800 toll-free, 900 premium-rate, or 911 emergency
service lines), therefore, only some businesses would benefit from this technique. ANI ser-
vice is also not always reliable at capturing the caller’s ANI number. Placing a legitimate
call using an outbound VoIP service or a calling card service would result in a non-working
or a generic ANI number being captured. As a result, false positives may frequently occur
which hinders user acceptance.
ANI-II Filtering can be used to filter spam calls by blocking certain types of origin ser-
vice captured by the ANI-II service. ANI-II [106] is an extension of the ANI service that
identifies the type of service associated with the originating switch. Each type of service
is represented by a two-digit code. ANI-II Filtering assumes that legitimate callers would
have a valid (00 or 61) ANI-II code, whereas, malicious callers would be making VoIP
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calls that would have an invalid ANI Failure (02) code, and therefore should be blocked.
However, with the growing use of VoIP service by regular consumers, this technique could
potentially result in too many false positives if all calls with ANI Failure codes are blocked.
Only some businesses would benefit from an implementation of this technique, as ANI-II
service is usually offered only to premium-rate, toll-free, or emergency lines. Therefore,
this technique would not be accessible or cost effective for the regular consumers.
4.2.2 Voice Interactive Screening
Voice Interactive Screening is a category of techniques that forces the caller to interact
with a voice input-based interactive system and decide if the call is spam after analyz-
ing the caller’s interaction. The system either requires active or passive interaction from
the caller. An active interaction system relies on the caller providing a response to a spe-
cific task which requires some effort from the caller, whereas a passive interaction system
silently gathers the caller’s response without explicitly informing the caller. Voice Inter-
active Screening techniques do not need to rely on the caller ID or any other call request
header information, hence they are generally not vulnerable to caller ID spoofing. How-
ever, Voice Interactive Screening techniques generally require processing of audio signals,
which tends to be more complex to implement. Because these techniques can only work
after recording a length of the caller’s voice, all Voice Interactive Screening techniques
have a screening period, therefore, would introduce additional delay to the caller. Due to
the recording of the caller’s voice during the screening, in the US, some states require ex-
plicit consent of recording the conversation, which could hinder the screening process or
invoke privacy fears from some legitimate callers. As telephone audio can be manipulated,
and tends to contain artifacts such as background noise, network dropouts, or compression
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losses, Voice Interactive Screening techniques are generally more prone to errors.
Audio Fingerprinting uses the voice recording of the caller, or audio features extracted
from the voice recording of the caller, to analyze for similarity to a set of known spam call
profiles. If the voice recording is similar to an audio stream of a known spam profile, then
the call is classified as spam. Audio Fingerprinting has been proposed to combat replayed
voice spam in several works [107–113]. However, the performance of Audio Fingerprinting
depends on the completeness of spam profiles, which is usually not feasible for a recipi-
ent to collect. Audio Fingerprinting would usually require a thirty-party to continuously
collect and maintain the known-spam audio profiles to ensure effectiveness. However, a
spammer could potentially defeat the mechanism by dynamically creating variations of the
spam audio message (such as adding audio artifacts or using personalized messages) to
avoid identification.
Speech Content Analysis first records the caller’s voice, then makes use of speech recog-
nition technology to transcribe the voice into text. The text is then analyzed with text
profiles of known spam calls to classify if the call is spam. As opposed to managing audio
recordings, a corpus of text data is usually much easier to manage. As many spam calls
are simply variations of a call script, a keywords-based classification model could be used
against variations of a same type of spam [114]. However, the effectiveness of this tech-
nique depends on the accuracy of speech recognition, and of course the effectiveness of
the classification model. In practice, automatic speech recognition of telephone voice is
an ongoing research problem [115], which tends to be prone to errors, and still has several
years to go to reach human-level performance [116].
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Acoustic Pattern Analysis extracts distinguishing acoustic patterns from the caller’s audio
stream, such as signal losses [117], peak uniformity [117], noise uniformity [117], voice
activity [118, 119], and double talks [118–120], to determine if the call is spam. Audio
Fingerprinting looks for general patterns in the audio signal that can broadly distinguish
spam calls from legitimate calls. Unlike Audio Fingerprinting and Speech Content Analy-
sis, Acoustic Pattern Analysis does not require a large collection of known-spam profiles,
which could be difficult to gather and maintain. However, some patterns may be prone to
false positives and could be easily defeated with manipulation of the audio stream.
CAPTCHA/Turing Test is an interactive challenge-response technique that requires the
caller to complete a reverse Turing test to determine whether the caller is a human or robo-
caller. The tests are designed to be difficult for a computer but easy for a human to com-
plete. For instance, the test could ask the caller to key in what they hear from a distorted
audio stream of random numbers [121–123]. However, CAPTCHA/Turing Test would
need to be careful not to discriminate against certain groups of people, such as people with
poor English or disabilities, while not giving too much leeway for abuse by “decaptcha"
systems [124]. On the other hand, CAPTCHA/Turing Test would also need to be careful
not to be illegible even for users with no handicaps, as the legitimate caller may become
irritated by the obstacles of initiating a call with the recipient. Because CAPTCHA/Turing
Test is highly interactive, it tends to require a high degree of effort, and cause significant
delays to the caller.
4.2.3 Caller Compliance
Caller Compliance is a category of techniques that require the caller to first satisfy a
compliance requirement prior to or during a call request. If the caller is able to satisfy the
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compliance requirement, then the caller is allowed to communicate with the recipient. Sat-
isfying the requirements should be easy for a legitimate caller but difficult (or costly) for a
spammer. Some compliance measures require special changes made to the call setup pro-
cess or to the communicating terminals. Some techniques require prior instructions given
to the caller.
Do Not Call Registry simply provides a registry of phone numbers that spammers are
legally prohibited from calling in most circumstances. The spammer may be subject to
substantial fines if they fail to comply. The registry is usually maintained by the national
government, in the US [68], the list is maintained by the Federal Trade Commission. How-
ever, the recipients would need to actively provide feedbacks for the government to legally
act on spammers violating the law. The Do Not Call Registry can act as a good deter-
rence for domestic law-abiding telemarketers, however, it would have little effectiveness
on spoofed numbers and overseas spammers.
Graylisting [125] first rejects the initial call request from a caller and then accepts the next
call request from the same caller made within a short period of time. This technique de-
fends against autodialers that simply call a list of phone numbers and do not make repeated
call attempts. The technique also assumes that if an uninformed (about the defense) caller
is calling about legitimate business, the caller will try again. The implementation is sim-
ple and does not require changes to the infrastructure. However, the legitimate caller must
make two calls for every call request, which introduces additional delay and calling cost.
A spammer could easily defeat the Graylisting mechanism by configuring the autodialer to
automatically call again if a call goes unanswered, but at the cost of higher phone bills and
reduced efficiency.
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Consent-based Communication first requires the caller to send a consent request to the
recipient before initiating a call. For instance, the request could be a forwarded greeting
message where an answering machine first records the name spoken with the caller’s voice
and then plays it to the recipient [126–128]. The recipient then decides whether to accept
the caller’s request to communicate. If the call is spam, the recipient is only limited to be-
ing exposed to an abridged recording (or the request message) of the spam call. However,
the recipient is still disturbed for every unconsented caller, therefore it is not scalable, and
the recipient is not spared from the disturbance of a spam call. It also adds delay to each
call, as legitimate callers are forced to wait for consent before each call.
Call Back Verification first rejects an initial call from a caller, then forces the caller to
wait for the recipient to call back the caller. Call Back Verification is a good defense
against caller ID spoofing, as it forces the caller to provide a genuine caller ID. The basic
mechanism is simple, and some implementations try to automate this process [129, 130].
However, it requires the caller to first own a reachable inbound number, which could re-
strict communication from legitimate VoIP users and telephone extension terminals. Call
Back Verification also add delays to each communication, as the legitimate caller must wait
for the recipient to call back. Calling back could also add calling cost on both the caller
and recipient in PSTN, which can be especially significant for premium or international
numbers.
Weakly Secret Information requires the caller to demonstrate knowledge of a weakly
secret information before allowing communication with the recipient. Weakly secret in-
formation could be in various forms such as a passcode, an extension code, a limited-use
phone number, or a message identifier [131]. However, the recipient would first need to
share the weakly secret information to all trusted callers, hence it may not be scalable for
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a recipient with a large contact list. Legitimate calls from unknown callers would also be
restricted from communicating with the recipient.
Payment at Risk is a micropayment, cost-based, technique where the caller is required
to deposit a small amount of money before making a call. If the recipient reports that
the call is spam, then the deposit is confiscated or kept by the recipient, otherwise, the
money is refunded to the caller. This was proposed as a method for SIP spam preven-
tion [84]. This technique prevents spamming by making it prohibitively expensive to send
out a large amount of spam calls, while costing very little for legitimate callers. However,
the solution requires a universal micropayment system that collects payment on every call,
which may require significant resources to create and administer. There also are many
questions regarding the legality of this approach, for instance on the lawful confiscation of
payments and abuse of spam reporting. The value amount of the deposit would also affect
the number of recipients needed to report on the spam caller to effectively make spamming
unprofitable.
Proof of Work is a computational, cost-based, technique where the caller’s terminal is re-
quired to produce a proof-of-work, such as hashcash [132], that is moderately hard to com-
pute (being computational or memory-bound) but easy for the recipient to verify, before
allowing communication with the recipient. As the amount of work increases, it would be
prohibitively inefficient to distribute large amounts of spam calls. A legitimate caller would
not be significantly affected when making a few phone calls. On one hand, Proof of Work
has an advantage over Payment at Risk by not requiring a micropayment system, therefore
avoiding the administrative and legality issues. On the other hand, Proof of Work faces a
trade-off problem between permissiveness and anti-spam effectiveness. In PSTN, due to
the significant share of low-end telephone terminals, the difficulty of the work would need
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to be low enough to ensure permissiveness. However, this may allow a spammer using
moderately powerful computerized terminals to easily generate as much work as needed
for spamming. Legitimate callers with high outbound calls, such as a bank, may also be
obstructed from doing legitimate business if it is prohibitively costly to generate the proof-
of-works to contact a large number of customers.
Proof of Identity requires the caller to send a verifiable identity token that would authenti-
cate the credentials of the caller whenever making a call. This technique has been proposed
for SIP domain users [129, 133–135], due to the availability of SSL/TLS certificates and
maturity of the underlying public key infrastructure. This technique prevents spamming
by ensuring that the caller could be held responsible for making illegal calls, and prevents
scams by ensuring that the caller cannot impersonate as someone else. Proof of Identity
could also prevent a spammer from using multiple identities when identity verification is
required. Proof of Identity has an advantage over Proof of Work by not having the issue of
deciding the right difficulty level of proof-of-work which could either obstruct calls from
low-end telephone terminals or give too much leeway for spamming. However, the scheme
could be hard to deploy in PSTN, as it would require establishment of a certificate authority
for issuing and verifying caller identities, and may require significant changes to the call
request protocols in PSTN.
4.3 Assessment Criteria
It is clear that there is no shortage of techniques to combat telephone spam, but what
would an ideal telephone spam defense entail? Therefore, we propose a set of assessment
criteria.
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We separate the assessment criteria into three categories: (1) Usability, which evaluates
the ease-of-use from either the caller or recipient’s perspective, (2) Deployability, which
evaluates the ease of installation, deployment, and operation, and (3) Robustness, which
evaluates the technique’s resilience against errors and effectiveness against a spammer ac-
tively evading the defense. We define each of the identified criteria and give a mnemonic
name.
4.3.1 Usability Criteria
No-Disturbance-to-Recipient When a known-spam call arrives, the technique does not dis-
turb the recipient, such as prompting for additional action from the recipient.
Scalable-for-Recipient The technique does not increase the burden of work on the recipient
with an increasing number of spam calls. The technique can handle a large variety of spam
calls with minimal input from the recipient.
Effortless-for-Caller When initiating a call, the technique requires minimal or zero effort
from the caller.
Negligible-Changes-to-Call-Setups The technique requires negligible changes to the exist-
ing call setups or configurations in the callers’ terminals.
Negligible-Delays When initiating a call, the technique adds negligible or unperceivable
delay to the caller, other than the typical time to connect and time waiting for the recipient
to answer the phone.
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Permissive-for-VoIP-Callers The technique would not restrict any legitimate calls that use
VoIP service. For instance, some outbound-only VoIP users (such as Skype) tend to have a
generic (or unavailable) caller ID number and cannot receive incoming PSTN calls.
Permissive-for-Unknown-Callers The technique would not restrict calls from a legitimate
caller not known by the recipient.
4.3.2 Deployability Criteria
Negligible-Changes-to-Infrastructure The technique requires zero or negligible changes to
existing PSTN protocols, terminals, or infrastructure.
No-Third-Party-Involvement The technique does not require a third-party. A compromise
of the third-party would not result in mishandled calls or in a breach of privacy.
Low-Resource-Requirement The technique is lightweight and does not require a significant
amount of resources (e.g., people, equipment, engineering, or funding) to initiate and de-
ploy.
Low-Maintenance The technique requires low maintenance, in terms of administrative cost,
time, or resources, to maintain good working order.
Negligible-Cost-per-Call The technique adds negligible cost to each call, taxed on the le-
gitimate caller, recipient, third-party, or carriers. The cost could also be indirect, such as
reduced efficiency or capacity.
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4.3.3 Robustness Criteria
Effective-Against-Dynamic-Caller-ID-Spoofing The technique is robust even when the spam-
mer spoofs different caller IDs nondeterministically.
Effective-Against-Targeted-Caller-ID-Spoofing The technique is robust even when the spam-
mer spoofs a specific caller ID known to be trusted by the recipient.
Effective-Against-Unavailable-Caller-ID The technique is robust even when the spammer
makes the caller ID unavailable or sends a faulty caller ID to cause errors.
Effective-Against-Multiple-Identities The technique is robust even when the spammer ini-
tiate calls from multiple sources, such as using multiple subscriber accounts or a telephone
botnet, to disseminate spam calls. This is different from caller ID spoofing where the caller
IDs are not necessarily spoofed but are instead initiated from different sources.
Effective-Against-Answering-Machine-Detection The technique is robust even when the
spammer uses Answering Machine Detection technology, which is a feature in autodialers
that can distinguish human pick-ups from answering machines. With AMD, an autodialer
can be configured to call again later if the call was not answered by a human, or to deliver
the audio message into the recipient’s voicemail.
Effective-Against-Dynamic-Audio-Content The technique is robust even when the spam-
mer uses an autodialer capable of personalizing or altering the audio messages for different
recipients. This is usually featured in autodialers that are able to synthesize text to speech.
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We evaluate each technique using the criteria proposed in Section 4.3 and Table 4.2
visually summarizes this evaluation. Each technique is evaluated as either satisfying the
criteria (denoted as ), may satisfy the criteria (denoted asG#), or not satisfying the criteria
(denoted as #). “May satisfy the criteria” means that the technique can be made to satisfy
the criteria depending on the implementation or configuration, while some implementations
do not fully satisfy the criteria.
Of course, this analysis requires some opinion, and in each case, we evaluated each
technique and criteria to the best of our abilities. While others may disagree with the
exact assessment of each technique, we believe that the criteria outlined in Section 4.3 will
help to guide future telephone spam defenses and to provide a framework to evaluate these
defenses.
4.4 Combining Techniques
From analyzing all the standalone techniques, it is clear that there is no single technique
that can satisfy all the criteria. No technique is a complete solution to the spam problem,
and each has trade-offs between usability, deployability, and robustness. Therefore, an
improved anti-spam system would look to combine different techniques, to leverage the
positives and compensate the negatives. We outline the different ways in which a solution
could use a combination of standalone techniques.
Phased Decisions combine several techniques into a linear sequence (i.e., a pipeline pro-
cess) of decision stages. If an earlier technique determines the call is spam, then it may
not be necessary to run the evaluation techniques at later stages. This is suitable for com-
bining techniques that use information that are obtained chronologically, such as first using
Call Request Header Analysis, followed by Voice Interactive Screening. We found the use
of Phased Decisions approach in related works by Niccolini and Quitek et al. [142, 143],
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Call Request Header Analysis
Caller ID Blacklisting [70, 71]  G#        G#   # # # G#   
Caller ID Whitelisting [72, 73]      #    G#    # #    
Caller Reputation System [74–88, 136]  G#    G#   G# # G#  G# # # G#   
Caller Behavior Analysis [75, 78, 79, 81, 85, 87, 89–100, 137, 138]      G#   G# # G#  G# # # G#   
Device Fingerprinting [101]      G#   G# # G#  G# # G# G#   
Caller ID Anomaly Detection [102, 103]         G# G#   G# # G# #   
ANI-CPN Matching [104]     G#       G# G# # G# #   
ANI-II Filtering [104]     G#       G# G# # G# #   
Voice Interactive Screening
Audio Fingerprinting [107–113]   G# #     G# # # G#     G# G#
Speech Content Analysis [108, 114]   G# #     G# G# # G#     G# G#
Acoustic Pattern Analysis [117–120]   G# #     G# G# G# G#     G# G#
CAPTCHA/Turing Test [121–123]   # #      G# G# G#       
Caller Compliance
Do Not Call Registry [68] G# G# G#      # G# G#  # # # G#   
Graylisting [120, 125]   G# #  G#  G#    #       
Consent-based Communication [126–128] # # G# #  G#  G#    G#  G#     
Call Back Verification [129, 130] G# G# G# # G# G#      #       
Weakly Secret Information [131]  G# G# G#  # G# G#  G#         
Payment at Risk [84]  # G#   # # # # # # #       
Proof of Work [132, 139–141]      # G# #   G#        
Proof of Identity [129, 133–135]      # G# # G#  G#        
 = satisfy the criteria G#= may satisfy the criteria #= does not satisfy the criteria
Table 4.2: Evaluation of Various Standalone Techniques Against the Criteria Described in
Section 4.3
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Schlegel et al. [144], Gritzalis and Mallios [145, 146], and Azad and Morla [85].
Weighted Scoring combines several techniques by running each technique individually
and then combining the outputs to produce a final score by applying a weighted scoring
method. The classification of whether the call is spam is based on the final score. As
Weighted Scoring need to collect outputs from all standalone techniques, it is suitable for
combining techniques that can be performed simultaneously, such as the various standalone
Call Request Header Analysis techniques. We found the use of Weighted Scoring approach
in related works by Dantu and Kolan [147], Niccolini and Quitek et al. [142, 143], Schlegel
et al. [144], Hansen et al. [148], and Mathieu et al. [149].
Conditional Procedures combine several techniques based on a predefined set of rules
(i.e., a policy or an algorithm). This allows for higher flexibility of combining the tech-
niques, such as using a different sequence of standalone techniques based on the preference
of each recipient or the reputation of each caller. We found the use of Conditional Proce-
dures approach in related works by d’Heureuse et al. [150], Dritsas et al. [151], Scata and
La Corte [152], and Soupionis and Gritzalis [93].
We evaluate existing solutions using a combined approach and summarized which stan-
dalone techniques those solutions incorporated in Table 4.3. All of these works are mainly
focused on defense against SPIT, and some of these may include SPIT-specific techniques
that do not appear in our table. Again, this analysis requires some opinion, and we eval-
uated each solution to the best of our abilities. We believe that the various strategies of
combining techniques outlined in Section 4.4 will help to improve future telephone spam
defenses.
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[142, 143] [144] [145] [146] [147] [148] [149] [150] [151] [152]
Phased Decisions     
Weighted Scoring      
Conditional Procedures   
Caller ID Blacklisting         
Caller ID Whitelisting       
Caller Reputation System       
Caller Behavior Analysis        
Device Fingerprinting 
Caller ID Anomaly Detection
ANI-CPN Matching
ANI-II Filtering
Audio Fingerprinting 
Speech Content Analysis  
Acoustic Pattern Analysis 
CAPTCHA/Turing Test       
Do Not Call Registry
Graylisting    
Consent-based Communication   
Call Back Verification
Weakly Secret Information 
Payment at Risk
Proof of Work  
Proof of Identity   
Table 4.3: Summary of Various Anti-Spam Solutions Using a Combination of Standalone
Techniques
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4.5 Related Work
While in this chapter we have compared and analyzed the state-of-the-art research in
telephone spam defense, we will now discuss related survey papers. Most of the papers
focus on spam in the Voice over IP (VoIP) domain, so-called SPam over Internet Telephony
(SPIT), rather than the larger PSTN telephony network.
Keromytis [153, 154] presented two comprehensive surveys of VoIP security, which
summarized previous works related to VoIP security and organized them according to an
extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. The papers
reviewed many previous works addressing every type VoIP threat in the VoIPSA taxonomy,
with the social threats of spamming as one of the categories.
Baumann et al. [155] presented a survey of potential solutions to SPIT. The paper pro-
vided an overview and classification of SPIT prevention methods based on detection using
Signaling versus Voice and order-based Before Call versus After/While Call. The paper
also proposed a Biometric Framework for SPIT Prevention as a way to bind identities to
each caller.
Phithakkitnukoon et al. [156] presented a survey focused on five primary types of VoIP
attacks, SPIT being one of them. The authorized provided an introduction to the basic
knowledge of VoIP systems and its available security tools, and summarized a list of pro-
posed solutions for SPIT from previous literature.
Quinten et al. [157] presented a survey evaluating the techniques to prevent and re-
duce SPIT. The authors evaluated the effectiveness of techniques by dividing them into
four categories: unsuitable techniques, techniques with potential, suitable techniques, and
combinations of techniques.
Dantu et al. [158] presented a survey discussing the attacks and solutions in VoIP, with
VoIP Spam and Phishing being one of the attacks. The authors reviewed previous work
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addressing all types of VoIP attacks and proposed a high-level security architecture to make
the VoIP infrastructure more secure and robust.
Dritsas et al. [159] presented a survey reviewing a list of SPIT identification criteria
that can be used by anti-SPIT mechanisms and identified the different detection stages.
The authors propose two generic categories of SPIT identification criteria: SIP Message
criteria and SIP User Agent criteria. They also proposed a two-fold evaluation framework
for discovering possible SPIT messages.
Marias et al. [160] presented a survey assessing the threats and vulnerabilities that the
SIP protocol introduces. The authors also reviewed existing anti-SPIT mechanisms and
classified them into three classes: Prevent, Detect, and Handle. The paper also proposes
a list of qualitative and quantitative criteria to assess the effectiveness of the anti-SPIT
countermeasures.
Khan et al. [161] presented a survey reviewing various existing methods for preventing
spam in IP telephony. The paper also presented a discussion on the implementation costs
of different types of techniques and commented that no single technique is sufficient and
therefore a framework of multiple techniques is recommended.
Rosenberg et al. [162] presented an open memo reviewing various solutions that might
be possible to deal with SIP spam. The author also presented some borrowed techniques
that have been employed to deal with email spam. In conclusion, the author recommends
using identity related techniques, while also commented that identity techniques may be
vulnerable when a SIP request without an authenticated identity cannot know whether the
request lacked such an identity because the originating domain didn’t support it, or because
a man-in-the-middle removed it.
In general, most existing survey papers focus on techniques against SPIT or more
specifically spam in the SIP protocol. This chapter is focused on techniques to address
spamming in the PSTN telephony network. Some techniques for SPIT are not applicable
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to PSTN due to protocol differences. As far as we are aware, this is the first survey pa-
per specifically addressing spam calls directed to the PSTN telephony network. In terms
of evaluation differences, we are the first to propose a taxonomy to classify the existing
standalone techniques into three categories, the first to evaluate the standalone techniques
based on three sets of assessment criteria, and the first to outline the three strategies of
combining standalone techniques.
4.6 Conclusion
From analyzing and evaluating the existing solutions that attempt to address telephone
spam, we reach the conclusion that there is no universally acceptable solution to telephone
spam. Every approach thus far has different tradeoffs, specifically between usability, de-
ployability, and robustness.
From our analysis of the telephone spam ecosystem and defensive techniques, we be-
lieve that usability is the most important criteria for evaluating a defense. Unlike email,
which can be delayed or possibly lost due to a false positive, telephony solutions have a
high bar for user acceptance. Telephone users will not adopt techniques that impose an
excessive burden on both the caller and recipient. Therefore, future research into this area
must consider the usability of the defense from both the caller and the recipient perspective.
We believe that one promising avenue of research is using a combination of techniques,
which should improve the robustness of standalone techniques, and potentially each tech-
nique could address the weaknesses of the others. However, as the telephony system has
real-time immediacy constraints, care must be taken so that the combination of techniques
will not degrade the user experience due to higher complexity. Our intuition leads us to
recommend combining no more than two standalone techniques, as we observed that a
good balance of usability, deployability, and robustness could be achieved by using two
standalone techniques.
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One glaring issue that continually reoccurs when analyzing the telephone spam ecosys-
tem is caller ID spoofing. We believe that the key to combating telephone spam is to make
the caller ID trusted and verifiable, while making minimal changes to existing infrastruc-
ture. For instance, from our evaluation of Call Request Header Analysis techniques, they
provide the best overall usability and deployability, however, they suffer from robustness
due to the spammer’s ability to spoof the caller ID. If caller ID spoofing can be effectively
prevented, then we believe that Call Request Header Analysis would satisfy all of our eval-
uation criteria.
Telephone spam is poised to increase significantly, defrauding consumers of billions
of dollars. Therefore, an effective telephone spam defense is critical. However, the tech-
niques and approaches in combating email spam are inappropriate when applied to tele-
phone spam. We attribute this to differences not only in the technology used but more
fundamentally to the key challenges in dealing with telephone spam. This is why a survey
of the telephone spam defenses is necessary: to highlight these differences and to define an
ideal criteria. This chapter provided a framework to help guide and shape future telephone
spam defenses.
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Chapter 5
PROPOSING AUTHENTICATED CALLER ID TRANSMISSION
With a broad understanding of the current state of the art from the survey research, the
next phase of the research plan is to propose a countermeasure toward preventing telephone
spam. As we have discussed in the previous chapters, one glaring issue in telephone spam is
caller ID spoofing. In the current calling line identification presentation scheme, the caller
ID is trivially spoofed. Telephone spammers are able to use spoofed caller IDs to trick their
victims into answering unwanted calls and defeat a variety of countermeasures. To provide
a solution to this problem, this chapter will analyze the fundamental causes of caller ID
spoofing and, by analyzing the root cause, design an authentication scheme that addresses
the aforementioned fundamental security flaws for the current caller ID scheme. The key
idea of this proposal is to help prevent users from falling victim to phone impersonation
scams by using a security indicator, as well as provide a foundation for future defenses to
stop unwanted calls based on the real caller ID information.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We describe how caller ID spoofing works and the reasons that lead to its prevalence.
• We propose a caller ID authentication solution that results in the display of a security
indicator during the incoming phone call and describe why it matters for the user.
• We describe the design of the underlying authentication and verification mechanism
behind the security indicator.
• We provide a discussion on the security considerations for the deployment of the
authenticated caller ID infrastructure.
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This chapter contains prior work from the ITU Kaleidoscope 2016 [56], the IEEE Com-
munications Standards Magazine 2017 September Issue [163], a USPTO non-provisional
patent application [164], and a pending technical standards contribution at the study group
11 of the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector.
5.1 The Rise of Caller ID Spoofing
The caller ID is a generic name for a supplementary service offered by the called party’s
telephone company that provides the calling party’s telephone number to the called party’s
user equipment during an incoming call. It helps the called party to decide whether to
answer a call based on the caller’s phone number, and, to call back the caller if the call could
not be answered. Since its introduction in the 1990s, the caller ID service has now become
ubiquitous in almost every telephone service. Today, the caller ID number is also used in
other telephony services, such as SMS and MMS, and, with the prevalence of smartphones,
many smartphone apps and services also rely on the caller ID for identification.
The core process of providing the caller ID is known as Calling Line Identification Pre-
sentation (CLIP), which was first defined in ITU-T Recommendation Q.731.3 [43] for the
Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) network in 1993. The SS7 network is the backbone infras-
tructure for most of the world’s public switched telephone network (PSTN) telephone calls.
Even as the telephone backbone moves towards being carried by an IP packet-based infras-
tructure, Q.731.3 still plays a major role in providing the caller ID for telecommunications
and will continue to do so for many years to come.
In all major existing call signaling protocols (SS7, H.323, and SIP), caller ID is either
provided by the originating exchange or by the calling party. In SS7 and SIGTRAN (IP
version of SS7), caller ID is defined by the calling party number (CPN) parameter, where
the parameter is an optional part of the Initial Address Message (IAM). The IAM is sent
to the destination exchange as part of the basic call procedures according to Q.764 [27]
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to initiate a call. The IAM routes through transit exchange switches until it reaches the
destination exchange of the called party, in which the called party’s local exchange carrier
would convert and retransmit the CPN to a specific caller ID format for the called party’s
user equipment during the incoming call setup process, e.g. mobile or landline.
However, because the PSTN was traditionally regarded as a closed trusted network, the
caller ID scheme was designed with little security in mind. The telephone network relied
upon trust in switch operators to play by the rules. In the process of providing the caller’s
telephone number, the originating exchange can arbitrarily declare what caller ID number
is sent on a call-by-call basis.
Traditionally, a caller would need to gain control of an SS7 switch to have the capability
to customize the caller ID. In consumer telephony services, their caller IDs are typically
managed by the caller’s telephone carrier, preventing general users from spoofing the caller
ID. It was also prohibitively expensive for individuals and small businesses to gain switch
level access to the SS7 network, which kept the number of people with caller ID spoofing
capability small.
However, with the recent rise of IP access to the PSTN, cheap IP-based client protocols
(such as SIP [165]) are replacing the expensive traditional bulk telephone services (such
as ISDN). Cheap and accessible Voice-over-IP (VoIP) bulk telephony services are now be-
coming the norm. Today, the SS7 network is no longer exclusive to traditional telephone
carriers, there are many internet telephony service providers (ITSPs) that provide telephony
services over an Internet connection. With the popularity of the cloud services business
model, access to SS7 switch level capability can be sold as a service and is becoming
more available to untrusted parties. Some ITSPs sell customizable caller ID as a service
feature, along with mass distribution technologies such as voice broadcasting, voicemail
broadcasting, and SMS broadcasting, all provided over an Internet connection. With IT-
SPs, individuals and businesses are no longer limited to telephone services from their local
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telephone service providers. With an Internet connection, a malicious caller now has access
to a world of ITSPs that can provide features such as caller ID customization/spoofing.
The caller ID is defined by the calling party number (CPN) parameter. The parameter
value of the CPN is placed within the optional part of the initial address message. The
IAM follows the ISUP (ISDN User Part) message format as defined in Q.763 [37]. The
CPN parameter follows a structured binary coding format as defined in Q.763.3.10. The
calling party number parameter contains several codes, and the specifics of each code can
be found in Q.763 subclause 3.10 and 3.9.
To spoof the caller ID, the caller’s originating exchange or the calling party would
declare the CPN parameter with false information. In the US and many other jurisdictions,
the caller’s telephone service provider does not have any legal obligation to ensure that
the caller ID number is genuine before it is transmitted. Even in jurisdictions that forbid
telephone service providers from providing falsely declared caller ID information, with
Internet access to an untrustworthy telephone service provider, it is easy for a malicious
caller to start the call request from a different origin, and transmit the false caller ID to the
destination exchange of the called party.
At the heart of the issue, there is a lack of authenticity and accountability in the trans-
mission of telephone identities. The PSTN has transformed from a closed trusted ecosystem
to a diverse global ecosystem, mutual trust can no longer be relied upon to guard against
the abuses of trust in caller ID transmission. Addressing this issue requires the core pro-
tocol to provide a mechanism to ensure authenticity and accountability. This is why we
advocate for a standardized caller ID authentication scheme. By providing authentication
to the caller ID, authenticity and accountability of the caller ID can be assured. However,
for viable deployment of authenticated caller ID transmission, it requires mutual interoper-
ability. Therefore, standardization is the key to building a telephone ecosystem that could
rely on the assurance of caller IDs.
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5.2 Solution: Security Indicators
To provide a solution to this problem, we drew inspiration from the Internet. The In-
ternet is widely known for its exposure to intrusion and man-in-the-middle attacks from
untrusted parties around the world. In such a relatively untrusted environment, solutions
were developed to combat the identity spoofing.
(a) An Example of HTTPS Security Icon in Google Chrome
(b) An Example of Authentication Icon in
Gmail
Figure 5.1: Examples of Security Indicators in HTTP and Email communication
In the Internet ecosystem, the HTTP and email communication are arguably the most
popular types of communication used today. In HTTP communication, the universally
recognized padlock indicator with the name of the company displayed in the address bar of
modern web browsers (such as the one shown in Figure 5.1a) provides users with immediate
trust in the website’s domain and entity name identity.
In email communication, the key-shaped security indicator of the email sender (such
as the one shown in Figure 5.1b) in some email clients provides the users with immediate
trust in the identity of the email sender.
An example of a possible caller ID security indicator for an incoming call is shown in
Figure 5.2. The security indicator can be similarly attached to other forms of telecommu-
nication such as SMS and MMS.
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Figure 5.2: Example of the Proposed Caller ID Security Indicator for an Incoming Call
These security indicators are crucial to informing the user that the information is from a
verified source. The availability of the security indicator provides an immediate indication
of the authenticity of the sender’s identity. The recognizability of the security indicator
icon provides an immediate understanding of the functionality of the indication. By simply
recognizing an icon, users are able to quickly determine if the sender is authentic to protect
themselves from phishing and impersonation scams. The prevalence of security indicators
promotes awareness that the user should only trust senders that are verified, which would
inspire users to be more vigilant of calls and messages from unverified sources.
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Having a security indicator for telecommunication would also be an effective solution
against telephone spam. Apps and services can be built on top of the security indicator to
analyze if a call comes from an untrusted source to more effectively block unwanted callers.
With the growing prevalence of phone fraud, calls from billing, banking government, law
enforcement organizations would also benefit from providing authenticity of their caller
IDs, as their recipients would be certain that the caller is real and not an impostor, therefore
feel better assured receiving communication over the phone. Authenticated caller IDs may
also be useful for immediate customer identity verification, without relying on (possibly
stolen or guessable answers of) security questions to verify the identity of customers. As
there are also scam calls that spoof the caller IDs of existing customers, which the malicious
callers then trick the institution into emptying their customers’ bank account [166].
5.3 The Underlying Caller ID Authentication Scheme
Before we discuss the technical detail of designing the underlying caller ID authentica-
tion scheme behind the security indicator, we first present a quick overview of the parties
involved in the transmission of a call request.
Local
Exchange NetworkInterexchange Network
Local
Exchange Network
Originating
Exchange
Transit 
Exchange(s)
Called PartyCalling Party
Destination 
Exchange
Figure 5.3: Overview of the Parties Involved in the Transmission of a Call Request
Calling Party is the party initiating the call request with an user equipment (UE) or
software client that connects with the originating exchange.
Originating Exchange is a switch in the PSTN that generates and transmits the IAM
to the destination exchange pertaining to the call request from the calling party.
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Transit Exchange is an interconnecting switch in the PSTN that helps to route the
messages from the originating exchange to the destination exchange.
Destination Exchange is the terminating switch in the PSTN that receives the IAM
and sets up the call with the called party.
Called Party is the party with an user equipment or software client of the intended
called party for the call request.
In general, the sequences within a local exchange network define how user equipment
interacts with the local exchange carrier during a call setup, and the sequences within the
PSTN define how SS7 switches interact with each other during a call setup.
The current caller ID transmission scheme has two fundamental insecurities: (1) a lack
of verification and authentication of the declared caller ID and (2) a lack of integrity protec-
tion of the transmitted caller ID. The current calling line identification presentation scheme
allows the CPN to be declared arbitrarily. There are currently no mechanisms to protect the
CPN from unwanted modification during transmission. Even if the caller has proven that
she indeed owns that phone number, an actor (perhaps in association with the caller) along
the transit link may still intercept and alter the caller ID number.
Therefore, the design principles of a prospective caller ID authentication scheme must
address the aforementioned fundamental security flaws: (1) ensuring the caller ID is ver-
ified and authenticated (can only be produced by the calling party or the originating ex-
change) before transmission, and (2) ensuring the caller ID is guarded against unwanted
modification during transit. Furthermore, it is crucial that the users of caller ID authentica-
tion enjoy the same user experience as before, hence (3) it must also be able to coexist with
the existing call control signaling protocols.
When designing an authenticated caller ID scheme, an immediate idea is to model it
after the SSL/TLS protocol of the Internet. However, this design, although can be used to
secure the caller ID, is ill-suited for the PSTN. The PSTN primarily uses the SS7 protocol
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stack to service telephone calls, whereas SSL/TLS was mainly designed to encrypt data
communication, which has a significant transport and latency overhead. After establish-
ing an initial end-to-end connection with a TCP 3-way handshake, the SSL/TLS process
requires two additional round-trips (4-way handshake) to establish a secure connection.
Whereas, in the SS7 call request, this “handshake” is a one-way forward transmission (as
shown in Figure 5.4), where the originating exchange sends an initial address message
to the destination exchange, to reduce the delays of initiating a call. Implementing the
SSL/TLS scheme for SS7 would require all exchange switches to support the multi-way
handshake process, which not only require critical changes, it could potentially add signifi-
cant delays to the call request process. In addition, SSL/TLS is designed for a client-server
web environment, which requires the server (“called party”) to first acquire a certificate
from a certificate authority (CA), whereas, in the PSTN scenario, we are mainly concerned
with authenticating the client (“calling party”).
Calling Party Originating Exchange Destination Exchange Called Party
Dial & Setup
Initial Address Message (IAM)
Setup & Ring
Address Complete Message (ACM)
Ringback/Alerting
Answer & Connect
Answer Message (ANM)
Connect
Conversation
Figure 5.4: Overview of the Existing Call Request Transmission Process
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Therefore, we need to design an authentication scheme better suited for the PSTN.
Designed as an initial reference, we propose a caller ID authentication scheme, which will
guide and shape an authenticated calling line identification presentation process for the SS7
ecosystem.
Originating 
Exchange
Destination 
Exchange
Certificate Authority
Calling Party Called Party
Conversation
Authenticated IAM
Figure 5.5: Overview of the Proposed Architecture
The high-level idea of the scheme is to introduce a public key infrastructure (PKI)
scheme for the PSTN. The high-level architecture of the proposed scheme is shown in
Figure 5.5. The scheme will have Certificate Authorities (CAs) certify, issue, and revoke
caller ID certificates (CICs) for the calling parties that have proven ownership of their
respective telephone numbers. After successfully obtaining the CIC, the calling party’s
originating exchange can then use the caller ID certificate to generate an authenticated call
request, by extending the existing initial address message. Upon receiving an IAM call
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request, the destination exchange then checks for the presence and validity of authenticated
call request parameters and presents the validated caller ID using a security indicator during
the call setup to the called party.
The role of each actor with regard to the caller ID authentication scheme is as follows:
Certificate Authority is an entity in the PSTN that verifies phone number ownership
and issues caller ID certificates to a requester that successfully provided proof of phone
number ownership. The CA is a trusted third party, trusted both by the calling party and by
the called party relying upon the certificate. The CA is also responsible for revoking caller
ID certificates if needed.
Calling Party sets up a call request with the originating exchange for the called party.
Under the caller ID authentication scheme, the calling party or the originating exchange
may initiate a request to obtain a caller ID certificate from the CA.
Originating Exchange obtains and stores the caller ID certificate from the CA for the
calling party’s phone number. Upon a call request, the originating exchange generates
an authenticated IAM on behalf of the calling party and transmits it to the destination
exchange.
Destination Exchange receives the authenticated IAM and checks the validity and au-
thenticity of the call request, and it sets up the call with the called party with a security
indicator showing the caller ID verification status. The destination exchange may also for-
ward the authenticated IAM to the called party to allow verification to be performed at the
terminal for better security.
Called Party receives the call/ring request with a verification status or authenticated
IAM. The terminal displays an incoming call with a security indicator.
The processes of the authentication scheme can be logically divided into 2 parts: Caller
ID Verification and Authenticated Call Request.
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5.3.1 Caller ID Verification
In the Caller ID Verification process, the goal is for a CA to verify a calling party’s
ownership of a phone number, i.e. the phone number actually routes to the calling party,
and then issue a certificate. The verification process can take advantage of the fact that
receiving a call or message is proof of phone number ownership in the PSTN. In the actual
process, more steps are involved to ensure the authenticity the CA’s identity and integrity
of the certificate request. The calling party/originating exchange will thus need to generate
a public-private key pair and store the private key securely. After proving to the CA that the
calling party/originating exchange is really the owner of the phone number and the public
key, the public key of the calling party is signed by the CA with attributes indicating phone
number ownership information, turning it into a caller ID certificate.
In Caller ID Verification, the core process is sequenced as follows:
Prerequisites to the process: (1) the CA’s public key PS is publicly known, and (2) the
CA has his private key QS .
1. Originating exchange or calling party generates a public-private key pair for the call-
ing party’s phone number, PA and QA.
2. Originating exchange sends calling party’s phone number FromA and public key PA
to the CA.
3. CA creates an encrypted nonce ENonceS by first generating a random nonce NonceS
and then encrypting it with the calling party’s public key. ENonceS = Encrypt(PA){NonceS}.
This ensures that only someone with the calling party’s private key can decrypt
ENonceS .
4. CA signs the ENonceS to create a signature ENonce-SigS . This is to safeguard the
authenticity of the nonce during transmission.
5. CA sends ENonceS and ENonce-SigS back.
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6. Originating exchange verifies the signature ENonce-SigS to ensure CA’s identity.
7. If ENonce-SigS is verified, the originating exchange decrypts ENonceS with private
key QA to obtain NonceS .
8. Originating exchange sends decrypted NonceS to CA, proving that the originating
exchange/calling party is really the owner of the public key.
9. CA verifies NonceS and, if valid, sets a short expiration time ExpiryA and generates
a caller ID certificate (CIC) for the calling party CICA by signing the calling party’s
phone number FromA, public key PA, and ExpiryA using the CA’s private key.
10. CA sends CICA to the calling party’s telephone number FromA. The phone number
should route to the originating exchange or calling party.
A sequence diagram of the Caller ID Verification process is shown in Figure 5.6.
In actual deployment, there can be several CAs, allowing different users, such as in
different networks or regions, to verify with an appropriate CA.
With regards to the caller ID certificate format, the certificate could be based on ITU-T
X.509 format [167], and the telephone number in the certificate could be based on inter-
national E.164 format [168]. The required critical extension field for the X.509 certificate
could be as follows (in RFC5280 style [169]):
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE {intlPhoneNumber E.164}
E.164 ::== PrintableString (SIZE (3..15))
Although verification of a caller ID can also be done directly by the called party, where
the called party can check for the authenticity of a caller ID by simply calling/messaging
back the calling party’s phone number, which had been proposed in previous works [129,
130], however, this type of scheme add delays to each communication, and is repetitive for
each call request. With a PKI certification model, it eliminates the need for a connection-
oriented, repetitive callback verification on every call request.
107
A: Originating Exchange/Calling Party S: Certificate Authority
has private key, QShas CA's public key, PS
Generate calling party's
public-private keypair {PA,QA}
A's public key
and telephone number {PA, FromA}
Create an encrypted nonce ENonceS
by first generating a nonce NonceS
and then encrypting it with PA
ENonceS = Encrypt(PA){NonceS}
Sign ENonceS with CA's private key
ENonce-SigS = Sign(QS){ENonceS}
Send {ENonceS, ENonce-SigS}
Verify ENonceS using CA's
public key and signature
Verify(PS, ENonce-SigS){ENonceS}
If verified, decrypt ENonceS using
A's private key to obtain NonceS
NonceS =Decrypt(QA){ENonceS}
NonceS
Verify NonceS and if valid,
set an expiration time CIC-ExpiryS
and generate A's caller ID certificate.
CIC-SigS = Sign(QS){FromA,PA,CIC-ExpiryS}
CICA = {FromA,PA,CIC-ExpiryS,CIC-SigS}
Send CICA to FromA
Figure 5.6: Sequence Diagram of the Steps to Obtain a Caller ID Certificate
5.3.2 Authenticated Call Request
In the Authenticated Call Request process, the goal is for a certified calling party to
generate an authenticated call request that the called party trusts that the CA has guaranteed
that the caller ID really belongs to the calling party. When initiating a call request, the
calling party’s originating exchange will generate an extended IAM that includes some
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additional parameters that authenticate the call request. These additional parameters are
designed to prove that the caller ID is authentic, and the request is transient and unique
(non-repeatable) to guard against “cut and paste” or replay attacks by a man-in-the-middle
or malicious called party. Upon receiving the extended IAM, the destination exchange
checks the authenticity and validity of the call request and sets up the call with the called
party with a security indicator showing the caller ID verification status. The destination
exchange may also forward the extended IAM to the called party to allow verification to be
performed at the terminal for better protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
In Authenticated Call Request, the core process is sequenced as follows:
Prerequisites: (1) the originating exchange has CA’s public key PS , and (2) the origi-
nating exchange has caller ID certificate CICA and his private key QA.
1. Originating exchange generates an IAM for the call request as usual.
2. Originating exchange generates an IAM Signature IAM-SigA by signing all enclosed
fields in the IAM along with current the current UTC timestamp TimeA. The inclu-
sion of a UTC timestamp ensures that the call request is transient and unique with
regards to time and destination, in order to guard against “cut and paste” and replay
attacks.
3. Originating exchange attaches the UTC timestamp TimeA, IAM Signature IAM-SigA,
and Caller ID Certificate CICA in the optional part of the IAM and sends the extended
IAM to the destination exchange.
4. Destination exchange obtains the extended IAM and checks if CICA is valid, expired
or revoked.
5. If the CICA is valid, verify IAM signature against all the enclosed fields.
6. If the IAM signature is valid, check if the UTC timestamp is valid (within a reason-
able delay and clock drift), and check if the called party number is correct.
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7. Setup the call request with the called party and present a security indicator for the
verification result.
8. Destination exchange sends address complete message (ANM) with verification re-
sult back to the originating exchange.
A sequence diagram of the Authenticated Call Request process is shown in Figure 5.7.
A: Originating Exchange/Calling Party B: Destination Exchange/Called Party
has caller ID certificate CICA
and private key QA
has CA's public key, PS
Generate Initial Address Message IAMA
Generate IAM signature IAM-SigA
by signing IAMA with the current
UTC timestamp TimeA
IAM-SigA = Sign(QA){IAMA,TimeA}
IAMA with {TimeA, IAM-SigA,CICA}
Check CICA expiration,
revocation and signature
If CIC is valid, verify IAM signature
If IAM-SigA is valid, check
TimeA and called party number
Setup the call and
present verification result
to the called party
Address Complete Message (ACM)
with verification result
Figure 5.7: Sequence Diagram of the Steps to Initiate an Authenticated Call Request
The existing parameters of the IAM is listed in Q.763 [37] Table 32. The proposed
extended IAM parameters could be as follows in Table 5.1.
To ensure transit compatibility, the extended IAM would include a Parameter Com-
patibility Information parameter to instruct the existing transit exchanges to transparently
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Parameter Type Length (octets)
UTC Timestamp Optional Part 4-?
Signature Algorithm Optional Part 1-?
Signature Optional Part 16-?
Caller Identity Certificate Optional Part 32-?
Table 5.1: List of Extended IAM Parameters
forward the extended parameters to the destination exchange. The specifics of Parameter
Compatibility Information parameter can be found in Q.764 (12/99) section 2.9.5.3.2 [27].
The Authenticated Call Request process does not change the existing one-way process
of transmitting the call request using the IAM, which is what enables a call request to be
delivered quickly and thus can be implemented without adding perceivable delay to the
existing user experience of initiating a call.
To inform the originating exchange that the authenticated call request has successfully
pass verification at the destination exchange, we also recommend including a Request Ver-
ification Status parameter in the optional part of the address complete message to provide
a feedback on the verification result. This would be useful for the originating exchange to
determine if the extended IAM has been successfully verified by the destination exchange
and make corrections if needed.
After the last step, the called party decides whether to answer the call request based on
the caller ID and the verification result.
5.3.3 Security Considerations
Even as we outlined the scheme to authenticate the caller ID, we also need to assume
that there is a constant threat of malicious actors stealing the caller’s identity, such as by
mobile phone theft, or using a malware to steal the private key. Furthermore, having a valid
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caller ID certificate does not imply that the caller should always be trusted. As a critical
security measure, the certificate authority must also be able to deal with revocations of a
previously issued certificate.
Learning from the pains of revoking certificates on the Internet, where using Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) [170] has the disadvantage of distributing bulky lists for large num-
ber of revocations, and the alternative Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [171] has
the disadvantage of requiring the receiving party to open a real-time connection with the
CA, potentially stalling the communication, therefore, we need to explore a more suitable
approach for handling certificate revocations in the PSTN.
With that in mind, first, we recommend using CRL over OCSP when verifying revoked
certificates. A phone call is more urgent compared to email and web communication,
if a phone call is stalled by the certificate verification process, it will severely affect the
user experience. It is important that the authentication scheme does not cause perceivable
delays, otherwise, some users may even choose to abandon security verification. CRL has
an advantage over OCSP in this regard, because the revocation list can be cached at the
destination exchange for immediate verification. The downside of CRL is that it does not
receive real-time revocation updates, however, the risks can be mitigated by having the
originating exchange or calling party choose to use shorter-term certificates, and by having
the destination exchange choose to update the revocation list more frequently.
Second, unlike domain certificates which are typically valid for years at a time, in
PSTN, we recommend the CA issue short-term caller ID certificates to limit the expiration
period. There are two reasons for having short-term certificates. First, it reduces the risk
from a successful theft of the certificate private key or phone number by containing the
impersonation threat within a bounded period. Second, it significantly reduces the size
of revocation lists as the CA would only need to revoke unexpired certificates within the
bounded period. Of course, the downside of having short-term certificates is that caller ID
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certificates must be renewed frequently. However, unlike domain certificates which can
hours due to DNS propagation delay, caller ID certificate renewals could be completed
within seconds as the process of verifying a telephone number can be fully automated.
Furthermore, because the number of future certificate renewals is largely predictable, the
CAs would be able to pre-adjust the quality of service to meet future demands, and perhaps
even pre-generate some caller ID certificates to further improve service efficiency.
Finally, we recommend the CA issue caller ID certificates for conditional usage, limit-
ing the usage to a specific method of contact or capability of the calling terminal, such as
by whitelisting/blacklisting features such as SMS, MMS, call forwarding, etc. This further
reduces the risk from a caller identity theft by containing the threat to limited methods of
contact. For instance, it is unlikely that a customer support phone would need to contact
individuals using SMS or MMS, hence, a successful theft of the company’s caller identity
would force the attacker to use voice when contacting the victims, which could make the
scam sound suspicious.
5.3.4 Local Deployment Considerations
As we outlined the process to verify the calling party number at the destination ex-
change, we also need to consider how the security indicator for the caller ID verification
status would be transmitted and presented to the called party.
At the destination exchange, the local exchange carrier would present the caller ID ver-
ification status in a local exchange call setup format (e.g., POTS, GSM, SIP, etc.). Hence,
for a local exchange network to support the caller ID verification scheme, some type of
modification/extension to the local call setup format is required, since each SS7 call re-
quest will need to be converted to a local call setup format. An immediate thought is to
implement the caller ID verification status as a simple indicator flag/parameter added to the
local exchange call setup format. However, there are some risks in such implementation.
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We would like to provide some discussion on how a conversion of an authenticated call
request should be implemented.
In mobile telephone services, caller ID is typically a parameter within a SETUP mes-
sage transmitted to the called party’s user equipment via an encrypted wireless signal.
Assuming that the wireless transmission is well encrypted, a key consideration here is
whether the identity of the base station is authenticated. In technologies that provide mu-
tual authentication between the mobile phone and the base station, the presentation can be
implemented as a flag indicator parameter, after performing the call verification at the des-
tination exchange. However, in technologies where base station authentication is missing
or flawed (such as in GSM), the local exchange network should not use the flag indicator
approach, because the verification status flag would be vulnerable to being spoofed by an
attacker that could spoof a base station. Instead, the presentation of caller ID verification
status should be implemented as a forwarding of the extended IAM parameters, transmitted
to the called party, to allow the called party’s user equipment to perform verification of the
authenticated call request.
In landline telephone services, namely the POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service), caller
ID is a parameter within the header message encoded in SDMF (Single Data Message For-
mat) or MDMF (Multiple Data Message Format), transmitted to the called party in FSK
(Frequency Shift Keying) signal. Assuming that the connection to the central office ex-
change is secure (such as from physical protection), a key consideration here is whether
the call request header is integrity protected. In POTS, the call request header is potentially
vulnerable to “Orange box” attacks, where a malicious caller is able to alter the SDM-
F/MDMF header with spoofed FSK signals, as a result, the verification status flag would
be vulnerable to being spoofed by the malicious caller. Hence, in such cases, the caller
ID verification status should also be implemented as a forwarding of the extended IAM
parameters to protect the integrity of the authenticated call request.
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Therefore, in summary, when implementing the presentation of caller ID verification
status to the called party, only in scenarios where (1) the local exchange network connec-
tion is secured, (2) the identity of the local exchange carrier is authenticated, and (3) the
call request header is integrity protected, should the local exchange carrier implement the
presentation of verified caller ID as an indicator flag, otherwise, the caller ID verification
status should be implemented as a forwarding of the extended IAM parameters to allow the
called party’s user equipment to perform verification of the call request.
5.4 Related Works
Peterson et al. [57] recently proposed an identity authentication mechanism for end
users that originate SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) requests. The scheme proposes hav-
ing the SIP proxies generating and inserting a PASSporT object [172] (a type of identity
token) in the Identity header of every SIP request. Other than transport protocol and data
format differences, the scheme uses a similar identity-token based mechanism in authen-
ticating and verifying the caller identity. However, Peterson et al’s proposal requires TLS
connection for every communication, for reasons mentioned before, is difficult to adapt to
the PSTN.
Reaves et al. [173] recently proposed an in-band modem for executing a TLS-inspired
authentication protocol over the voice channel of the conversation. The modem is designed
to overcome the challenges of low transmission bitrate due to voice codec and transmission
losses. After the in-band modem established a data channel between the two parties over
the voice channel, the scheme uses a cryptographic challenge-response based scheme to
verify the caller’s identity. The scheme can provide strong security guarantees comparable
to the TLS. However, the verification process require both parties’ telephone terminals to
support read-write access and live processing of the voice signals, which would require
significant computation power on both parties’ telephone terminals. It could also invoke
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privacy fears due to voice recording capability, and potentially add significant delay prior
to the voice conversation.
5.5 Conclusion
With increasing abuse of PSTN’s insecurities from untrusted parties, telephone spam,
phone fraud and caller ID spoofing is poised to increase significantly. To ensure a sustain-
able future for the PSTN, the SS7 is in critical need of an upgrade of its core robustness.
This chapter proposes a standardized authentication scheme for the caller ID that enables
the possibility of a security indicator for SS7 telecommunication. The goal of this proposal
is to help prevent users from falling victim to telephone spam and scams, as well as provide
a foundation for future and existing defenses to stop unwanted telephone communication
based on the caller ID information.
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Chapter 6
IMPLEMENTING PROTOTYPE WITH EVALUATIONS
With a description of the architecture, protocols, and security mechanisms of the caller
ID authentication scheme, the final phase of the study is to implement a prototype and
evaluate the implementation in terms of performance and user experience. The evaluation
result can help us validate the assumptions made in the proposed scheme and inspire future
improvements and refinements. In this chapter, we describe the design and implementa-
tion of an end-user prototype based on the proposed caller ID authentication scheme. The
prototype was implemented using the Android framework for Android smartphones. After
implementing the prototype, we conducted a performance analysis and an end user study
based on the participants’ behavior data and feedback. With the user study, we were able
to better understand how to design telephone security indicators that meet the users’ ex-
pectations and learn what improvements can be made for the future iterations of end-user
implementation.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We design an end-user prototype and implement the proposed security indicators and
caller ID authentication scheme.
• We analyze the performance of different design variants and present our analysis for
future performance improvements.
• We conduct a user study by collecting user behavior and feedback and present our
findings from interacting with the users.
• We provide a list of recommendations for the future implementations of authenticated
caller ID transmission.
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6.1 Prototype Design
In the previous chapter, we described the proposed security indicators and caller ID
authentication scheme based the adding new components to the existing SS7 protocols and
infrastructure. We initially wanted to develop a prototype implementation of the SS7 in-
frastructure itself as that would provide the best demonstration of our idea. However, after
carefully studying what is needed to develop a prototype implementation for the SS7 in-
frastructure, we eventually realized that such implementation would unfeasible for a Ph.D.
student project. As every project has time and resource constraints, implementing any-
thing directly on the SS7 infrastructure would require tremendous time and money. The
core customers of the SS7 infrastructure are telephone service providers, with only a small
circle of huge multinational telecommunications equipment vendors supplying the entire
global market of telecommunications providers. If we were to implement a prototype on
the SS7 infrastructure, we would need to acquire the equipment and set up a wired or wire-
less telecommunications network similar to a telephone service provider. The telecom is a
capital-intensive industry, a telecom company typically invests millions of dollars to set up
equipment on their network. Although we did not specially ask for how much a telecom
equipment costs, e.g. for just an SS7 gateway, we estimated that it would be at least tens of
thousands of dollars. Not only that, even after acquiring the equipment, it does not guaran-
tee that we will be able to make any changes to their proprietary firmware. Hence, we need
to look for other feasible ways to implement the proposed scheme.
As a viable alternative, we implemented a prototype to demonstrate the caller ID au-
thentication scheme that requires no modification to existing protocol standards or infras-
tructure. While an ideal deployment would be to embed the authenticated call request data
in the SS7 IAM itself, we implemented a version of the authenticated call request that
relies on out-of-band delivery using SMS instead of the IAM. Both the IAM and SMS
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use the CPN as the destination address to deliver information. As long as we can extract
the authenticated call request from the SMS before or during the call request, we can still
implement the caller ID authentication scheme with the same features.
In the vast ecosystem of telephone users, the vast majority are mobile phone users.
In many countries, mobile subscribers already surpassed the national population. Today,
Android smartphone users represent the vast majority of new mobile subscribers [174].
Globally, Google’s Android operating system runs on about 80% to almost 90% of the
smartphone marketshare [175].
Based on the described caller ID authentication scheme, we developed an Android app,
named “Hamout”, for the caller to verify the caller ID to the CA and transmit the authen-
ticated call requests upon an outbound phone call. We implemented another Android app,
named “Caller ID Verifier”, for the recipient to perform verification of the authenticated
call request and display a security indicator upon an inbound phone call. For the caller, the
app first communicates with the CA to obtain the caller ID certificate. Upon a call request,
the app generates an Authenticated Call Request and delivers it to the recipient using SMS.
For the recipient, the app automatically extracts and verifies the Authenticated Call Re-
quest from the SMS and displays a security indicator during the ring on an incoming call.
To implement the CA, we also developed a web and SMS server to provide the Caller ID
Verification service for the caller terminals. Both the caller’s and recipient’s Android app
are preinstalled with the CA’s public key certificates. Each Android app is signed, which
prevents modifications to the app code and the embedded public key certificates.
We will go into detail how each process is performed in the prototype implementation:
6.1.1 Caller ID Verification
Caller ID verification allows the CA to verify the caller’s phone number and provides
the caller with a caller ID certificate (CIC) for making future authenticated calls upon
119
successful verification. The Caller ID verification process is only needed if the caller does
not already have a valid CIC, such as a first time user. In our prototype implementation,
when running the Caller’s app, it detects whether a valid CIC is present in the app storage,
and, if not, it will initiate the registration process by automatically reading the device’s
phone number and, in case the user has a phone number that is not directly associated with
the device (e.g., a Google Voice number), optionally prompting the user to enter their phone
number. Figure 6.1 shows the phone number submission activity. When the user selects
OK, it generates an elliptic curve (NIST curve P-256 aka prime256v1) keypair, and then
securely sends the phone number and the public key to the CA over HTTPS. These actions
implement steps 1 and 2 of the proposed Caller ID Verification process as described in the
previous chapter.
When the CA server receives the request from caller’s app, it first generates a 24-bit
nonce and pins it to the caller’s phone number and public key for an expiration time of 300
seconds. The nonce, caller’s phone number, and public key are stored in a self-expiring
database. The CA then encrypts the nonce with the caller’s public key. The encrypted
nonce is replied back to caller’s app as a HTTPS response which ensures the response
message is secured and signed. When the caller’s app receives the HTTPS response from
the CA, it then decrypts the nonce. After that, it sends a new HTTPS request to the CA
with the decrypted nonce and waits for the caller ID certificated to arrive in SMS. These
actions implement steps 3 to 8 of the proposed Caller ID Verification process.
When the CA server receives the decrypted nonce, it looks up the caller’s public key
and phone number using the nonce. The CA generates the caller ID certificate (CIC) by
signing the phone number, public key, and Expiry time using the CA’s private key. The
CA then sends the CIC to the caller’s phone number using SMS. Figure 6.2 shows the
activity that waits for the Caller ID Certificate to arrive in SMS. The app tries to obtain the
Caller ID Certificate from the SMS automatically, if that failed, the user can manually copy
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Figure 6.1: Registering a Phone Number and the Public Key With the CA
and paste the Caller ID Certificate into the app. When the user selects OK, it verifies the
Caller ID Certificate signature, and if successful, the app is ready to make Authenticated
Call Requests in the next activity. These actions implement steps 9 and 10 of the proposed
Caller ID Verification process.
6.1.2 Authenticated Call Request
Authenticated Call Request allows a certified calling party generate a transient and
unique call request designed to prove that the caller ID is authentic. In our prototype im-
plementation, after the caller has successfully obtained a caller ID certificate in the Hamout
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Figure 6.2: Receiving the Caller ID Certificate From the CA
app, the user can make a call with Authenticated Call Request. Figure 6.3 shows the ac-
tivity that the user can make a phone call with Authenticated Call Request. The user just
needs to enter a phone number that he/she would like to call. When the “CALL” button is
selected, the app automatically generates an authenticated call request and sends it to the
recipient’s phone number via SMS. The SMS message is encoded in Base64, and sent in
multi-part SMS. After sending out the SMS, it automatically initiates a phone call to the
recipient’s phone number after a brief delay.
For the recipient, we implemented a separate app called “Caller ID Verifier”. The app is
designed to process and verify the Authenticated Call Request from the caller, and display
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Figure 6.3: Making a Call With an Authenticated Call Request
a security indicator upon an incoming call. During first run, the app presents a tutorial
to help the users get familiar with the security indicators. Figure 6.4 shows the tutorial
activity.
After the user is familiar with security indicators, the Recipient’s app runs in the back-
ground which has an event hook for incoming SMSes. When the Recipient’s app receives
an SMS message with the Authenticated Call Request, it automatically extracts and stores
it in a self-expiring cache. The Authenticated Call Request of the caller will be retrieved
from the cache when the incoming call arrives.
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Figure 6.4: Tutorial of Security Indicators
Upon the incoming call, the app first retrieves the Authenticated Call Request of the
caller from the self-expiring cache. After completing the verification process, one of three
types of security indicators would be shown: Secure, Caution, and Warning. The security
indicator display an overlay window over the incoming call screen. Figure 6.5 shows the
security indicators overlayed on the incoming call screen. If the ACR is in the valid format
and is verified for the caller ID certificate owner, then a secure indicator is displayed upon
the incoming call, as shown in Figure 6.5a. The secure indicator informs the recipient
that the caller ID is verified. If the ACR is missing (not received from the caller), then a
caution indicator is displayed upon the incoming call, as shown in Figure 6.5b. The caution
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indicator informs the recipient that the caller ID is not verified. If the ACR is invalid for any
reason (such as invalid signature), then a warning indicator is displayed upon the incoming
call, as shown in Figure 6.5c. The warning indicator informs the recipient that the caller ID
cannot be trusted.
(a) Secure indicator (b) Caution indicator (c) Warning indicator
Figure 6.5: Types of Security Indicators Displayed During an Incoming Call
The designs of the security indicators were kept consistent, which consists of an icon,
the caller ID/caller name, a text description of the caller ID status, time stamp, and a colored
background. To ensure design consistency, the colors and icons were based on Android
material design. When designing the text descriptions, the caller ID status messages were
inspired from Google Chrome’s HTTPS text description of the domain certificate status.
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Security Provider AndroidKeyStore 5.0 SpongyCastle 1.52
Signature Algorithm SHA256withECDSA SHA256withRSA SHA256withECDSA
ECC Curve prime192v1 prime256v1 - prime192v1 prime256v1
Key Size 192 bit 256 bit 1024 bit 3072 bit 192 bit 256 bit
Avg. Key Pair Generation Time 999.724 ms 1002.18 ms 1719.42 ms 23247.54 ms 424.88 ms 608.09 ms
Avg. ACR Sig Generation Time 14.51 ms 20.14 ms 35.85 ms 621.02 ms 402.39 ms 602.54 ms
Avg. ACR Sig Verification Time 7.2 ms 9.55 ms 5.81 ms 6.16 ms 525.16 ms 646.58 ms
ACR Size 71 bytes 87 bytes 143 bytes 399 bytes 71 bytes 87 bytes
ACR + CIC Size 217 bytes 265 bytes 484 bytes 1240 bytes 217 bytes 265 bytes
Median SMS Delivery Time 8579 ms 11480 ms 18610 ms 39762 ms -
Table 6.1: Performance Testing Results of the Prototype Implementation
6.2 Performance Analysis
To understand the runtime performance and suggest future performance improvements
to the implementation of the caller ID authentication service, we conducted a systematic
test of various cryptographic algorithms for the authenticated call request and their respec-
tive SMS delivery times.
The Android framework and its underlying Java ecosystem provide a multitude of cryp-
tographic providers. Therefore, we measured the empirical run-time performance of differ-
ent cryptographic algorithms that are potential candidates for future app implementation.
We also measured the data sizes of authenticated call request generated by different sig-
nature algorithms, to help us evaluate which type of Authenticated Call Request is small
enough to be delivered before the incoming call. We used an LG G3 which uses Snapdragon
801 processor on T-Mobile USA network as our benchmarking setup, and we performed
the experiments by varying the security providers and signature algorithms. The results of
our performance analysis are shown in Table 6.1.
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From the benchmark table, we can see that using ECDSA brings in tremendous per-
formance advantage over RSA. In comparison with RSA, Android’s ECDSA performed
better in almost every operation, except for signature verification where the difference is
unnoticeable at less than 4 milliseconds.
Comparing different security providers of ECDSA, AndroidKeyStore [176] (Android’s
stock security provider) performed much better than SpongyCastle [177] (an open source
security provider based on BouncyCastle), only requiring about 20 milliseconds for signa-
ture generation and 10 milliseconds for signature verification. Key pair generation using
AndroidKeyStore’s ECDSA implementation took about 1 seconds compared to about 600
milliseconds in SpongyCastle’s implementation, which is perceivably longer, however, we
consider it as acceptable in real-world usage because in the Hamout app the key pair gen-
eration is only performed once during caller ID certificate registration. Because signature
generation and verification are the most common operations in our scheme, based on the
benchmarked results, using AndroidKeyStore’s ECDSA implementation would provide the
best overall performance. The operation times are averages of 5 tests for each case, with
very little variances observed.
Furthermore, we are able to show that the ECDSA ACR fields would indeed fit within
the current call request headers, including POTS where the header message has the lowest
size limit of 256 bytes. From the test results, using SHA256withECDSA with prime192v1
curve with safely fit the fields within an MDMF header message in all cases. This shows
that the proposed ACR fields could be made compatible with existing call request specifi-
cations for universal PSTN adoption.
We also tested the SMS delivery delays using two Android phones running on two
separate GSM networks in the United States (AT&T and T-Mobile). Using the two separate
networks avoids in-network routing, and provides a better representation of the real world
performance. We have also tuned the caller’s SMS send rate such that we are reasonably
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sure that network throttling did not affect the delay duration. However, there are still many
other uncontrollable variables, such as traffic volume, equipment performance, wireless
interference, etc., that could affect the SMS delay. For each experiment, we sent out no less
than 250 SMSes containing both the ACR and CIC, and recorded their delivery times. After
running the tests, we found that the SMS delivery delay durations were not as consistent
as we thought. The SMS delivery times tend to have long-tail outliers. This finding was
surprising as we thought the SMS would be consistently delivered in near instantaneous
time. In reality, only about 94% falls within a narrow range of delay, the outliers have
delays that can be measured in minutes. Hence, we have decided to show the median
instead of average delay, in order to provide a much more representative number for our
tests.
From the SMS performance test results, we can see that the SMS delivery delays makes
the biggest impact on the user experience, adding about 8-12 seconds delay to the authen-
ticated call request process. Because of this long consistent delay, the app will need to
add a long wait time after sending the ACR to the recipient. This long delay is generally
unacceptable in the real-world, as this meant the caller may have to wait at least 8 seconds
to ensure the authenticated call request is delivered. Because of this issue, we felt that it is
important to provide our recommendations to solve this problem in the future production
versions of the authenticated caller ID transmission scheme.
We propose three solutions to solve the SMS delivery delay issue. The first solution
is to use MMS instead of SMS. MMS was introduced in the third-generation (3G) mobile
phones and has a theoretical data transfer rate up to 750X the rate of SMS transmission.
The transmission rate is much faster due to the introduction of faster network technology,
such as 3G HSPA and 4G LTE. However, the main issue with MMS is that it currently costs
1-3x more to send a MMS message compared to SMS in the US. Furthermore, MMS also
does not solve the fundamental issue of insistent delays from the carriers.
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The other alternative solution is to use the Cloud Messaging. Cloud Messaging a ser-
vice that uses the Internet infrastructure to facilitate messaging between app servers and
client apps, either over WiFi or cellular data network. Google’s Firebase Cloud Messag-
ing (FCM) is an example of a cross-platform cloud messaging provider [178]. The cost
of cloud messaging is much cheaper compared to MMS, with Google’s FCM, the cost is
free for low usage and scales cheaply with high volume. Theoretically, a cloud message
could be delivered as fast as WiFi or cellular data speeds. However, we do not yet know if
this solution would significantly reduce the ACR delivery time. In the worldwide produc-
tion version of the caller ID verifier app, we believe cloud messaging would be the most
scalable approach for delivering the ACR.
Ultimately, the goal of caller ID authentication scheme is to integrate the ACR in the
fields within the call setup header itself, making it almost indistinguishable from the exist-
ing calling procedures. The long-term vision is to make authenticated caller ID transmis-
sion an essential part of the call request process. In the future, every important call should
be authenticated. From the table, we are able to show that the ACR fields can indeed fit
within all existing call request headers using SHA256withECDSA with prime192v1 curve.
The ACR requires as low as 71 bytes and 217 bytes in the most conservative implementa-
tion, therefore, can safely fit within call request headers such as SS7/ISUP, UMTS, LTE,
and including POTS where the header message has the lowest size limit of 256 bytes. How-
ever, this solution requires standardization and modification to the SS7 infrastructure.
6.3 User Study
To understand the user behavior when they see the security indicators upon an incoming
call and learn about the potential use cases of caller ID authentication, we conducted a
systematic user study of user behavior by using the caller ID verifier app to collect the
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users’ call actions and feedback responses. Furthermore, the responses collected from the
participants can be used to inspire future improvements.
6.3.1 Study design
Our approach to designing the study is to first identify the user behavior and feedback
data that we will collect. After that, modify the caller ID verifier app such that the user
data could be collected and transmitted to our database. We then design a set of experi-
ments and procedures that allow comparison of different variations of the app. During the
execution, we recruited a population of participants and split the population equally among
the experiments. Each experiment has a standardized procedure and the procedure will be
conducted on each group simultaneously. Finally, tabulate the results and perform analysis
on the results. The study was conducted with IRB approval.
In the quest to understand what the user thinks about having a security indicator upon
an incoming call, we modified the caller ID verifier app to automatically collect and send
the incoming call action to us upon some incoming calls using the caller ID verifier app.
We collected the user’s action and the type of security indicator displayed upon an incom-
ing call. More specifically, we collect what kind of action was taken, i.e., answered, or
declined/ignored. This will give us an idea of which security indicator tend to lead to what
kind of action.
To reduce the privacy concerns, we only collected action data of incoming calls called
from our phone numbers. To also ensure that the participants are aware that the app collects
data from them, on the first run, the app will show a prompt screen to ask the participants
for their consent to participate in the research experiments and to collect information from
them. We managed to obtain IRB permission to conduct the study to collect data from the
participants.
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6.3.2 Participant Recruitment
Selecting participants size has several considerations. Unlike the experiments where we
conducted the telephone phishing research, this research requires greater participation from
each member. Recruiting a large group of participants may be regarded as statistically rig-
orous, however, their characteristics in relation to the real-world may still be questionable
at this stage. Having a smaller group allows us to focus our attention on a few participants,
whereas a larger group can lead to “social loafing” [179]. In fact, research shows that
collecting data in large sample sizes can lead to analysis in the topic of interests lacking
sufficient depth [180].
As a proof-of-concept prototype, the design of the prototype can heavily influence the
outcome of the statistical result. A production-ready real-world implementation of such
caller ID verifier can be designed very differently from the research prototype. Especially
for software design, making design iterations is a constant process. Therefore, any statis-
tical analysis of the research prototype would easily lose touch with a real-world imple-
mentation. The recruitment objective, in this case, is not collect data for statistical analysis
but rather to evaluate of the user behaviors and feedback and inspire refinements for future
implementation.
During the recruitment process, we disseminated recruitment posters through various
communication channels, including emails, bulletin boards, facebook, and local craigslist
ads. An example of the recruitment poster is shown in Figure 6.6. As an incentive to
participate in our experiments, we advertised that the first 50 participants will receive a
$10 Amazon gift card. To make it easy for the participant to download and install our
app, we posted our app on the Google play store and posted a link (with QR code) to it
with a shortened URL. We used the university’s URL shortener service to help inform the
participant the app is from the university and not a potential scam.
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Figure 6.6: Recruitment Poster
At the end of the recruitment effort, our app was installed 70 times and we recruited a
total of 57 participants for the experiments.
After the user installed our app, on the first run, the app shows a prompt screen asking
the participant give explicit consent to participate in the research experiments and to collect
information from them.
The user will need to read and scroll to the end of the consent information to find the
agree button. After the user agrees, the app will show an activity for the participant to pro-
vide their phone number. The participant’s phone number will be automatically verified by
receiving a phone call or SMS message with a confirmation code through the app. During
the process, we used a third-party service for the auto verify service to check if the phone
number works. Finally, the app asks for the user’s demographic information (age, gender,
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(a) Consent Form (b) Phone Number
Verification
(c) Demographics
Information
Figure 6.7: Procedure of Initial Set Up During First Run
education, occupation). Providing the demographic information is optional the user. After
the user selects “SUBMIT”, the user becomes a participant and the app sends the partici-
pant’s, phone number, and demographic information to our server via an encrypted internet
connection. The server randomly assigns the participant a group number (0-2) which de-
termines the participant’s experiment group. After that, the app is all set and is ready to
display the security indicators from our calls.
Experiment Procedure
The app prototypes are designed to display the telephone security indicator and understand
if the security indicator can influence the participants’ behavior upon receiving a call. To
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subject the participants to different types of influence, first, we evenly divided the partici-
pants in our study into 3 groups: group 0, group 1, and group 2.
Group 0 is the control group, where the app in this group would not display any security
indicators upon any incoming call. The participants in this group do not see any security
indicators. Hence, the participants in this group can be considered as similar to existing
phone users, having no influence of the security indicators.
Group 1 is the simulated group, where the app in this group would immediately display
a security indicator upon our incoming call. The participants in this group would see a
security indicator when the call from one of our caller IDs. We preselected three different
caller IDs for each of the three types of security indicators. This group is designed to show
the influence of the security indicators to call recipient behavior.
Group 2 is the prototype group, where the app in this group would first receive an
ACR via SMS and then display a security indicator upon our incoming call. We called
the participants in this group using our Hamout app. Both the secure and warning security
indicators require a valid or invalid ACR to be first delivered to the recipient prior to the call.
Caution security indicators do not require an ACR from the caller. This group is designed
to give us an idea of the SMS delivery mechanism on the effect of the security indicator, as
our performance analysis has shown that the ACR delivery is not always consistent.
During the experiment period, we encouraged the participant to communicate openly
with the researcher. In the app, we also added a menu shortcut to compose an email to write
to the researcher. After receiving a call from us, the app displays a notification asking the
participant to review the security indicator and provide a feedback. We collected the user
feedback in the form of questionnaires and free-form comments. The activity to collect the
feedback is shown in Figure 6.8.
In the app, we also provided a dashboard where the users could review the past security
indicator alerts, where selecting on one would lead us to the same activity to provide us
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Figure 6.8: Collecting User Feedback After the Display of a Security Indicator
with a feedback. The apps also incorporated a feature to receive announcements from the
researcher and the users could review the announcements in the dashboard.
The data in which the app collected from each participant is summarized in Figure 6.2.
6.3.3 Evaluation
During the experiment period of about 1 week, we sent out 168 phone calls in total,
about 3 phone calls to each participant. To ensure that the procedure is standardized, we
wrote a program to automate the process of sending out the telephone calls for group 0 and
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Figure 6.9: Reviewing Past Security Indicators and Announcements
group 1 participants. The content of the phone calls were all empty. During the experimen-
tal period, we called during the daytime (10am-5pm).
After disseminating the phone calls, we received a total of 136 records. Each record
consists of a collection of action and feedback data described in Table 6.2. Our evaluation
will present a discussion of the users’ data in each group.
Group 0 Participants
We received a total of 44 records from the participants in group 0. Looking at their call
action data, they have a 11:17 ratio of answering vs declining/ignoring (39% answer rate)
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Data Collected Description
Phone number The verified phone number of the participant.
Gender Optional response to the demographic question asking the gender of the participant.
Occupation Optional response to the demographic question asking the occupation of the participant.
Education Optional response to the demographic question asking the education of the participant.
Incoming call action The action taken upon an incoming call from us.
Incoming call action delay The amount of time from the start of incoming call to the action taken.
Incoming call count The number of incoming calls received from us.
Security Indicator Type The type of security indicator shown during the incoming call.
Has seen notification Participant’s feedback on whether the he/she saw the security indicator.
Action feedback Participant’s feedback on the action taken upon the incoming call.
Did notification led to action Participant’s feedback on whether the security indicator led to the action taken.
Other comments Participant’s feedback on other comments.
Table 6.2: Summary of Data Collected From Each Participant
upon an incoming call from us. The participants in this group are more likely to decline
call than answering, and we can use answering ratio as a basis to compare the influence of
security indicators to user behavior in the other groups.
We also received 3 feedback comments, and the 3 participants commented that they did
not receive any notification while they got the call. A participant also emailed me asking
if the app was working. This was deliberate so we did not reveal any information on why
their app does not seem to be working.
Looking that the call count information, only 5 of the 17 participants remained to sub-
mit their data to us on the 3rd call. The other groups have almost twice as much participants
remained to submit their data to us on the 3rd call. The shows that the other participants
in group 0 must have uninstalled the app because the app did not provide any useful func-
tion for the participants. This is an example of how low app engagement can lead to low
retention. As shown by many industry research, smartphone apps are generally subject to
anywhere from a 30 to 80% attrition rate of users within the first month. If an app does
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not provide enough engagement, the users may see the app as a useless tool and therefore
choose to uninstall it. With consideration of these results, we can learn that the design of
future implementations should think about user engagement.
Group 1 Participants
When disseminating the phone calls to group 1 participants, we called each phone number
with 3 different security indicators, as we wanted to compare if an individual would behave
differently when seeing different security indicators. To avoid the order effect of showing
the security indicators, we separated participants into 3 groups, each group receiving the
calls in a different order.
We received a total of 38 records and 9 comments from the participants in group 1.
Looking at their call action data, they have a 21:17 ratio of answering vs declining/ignoring
( 55% answer rate) upon an incoming call from us. Looking at the break down of ratios
of different security indicators: secure (caller ID is verified) indicators has the highest
ratio of 9:4 (69% answer rate), caution (caller ID is not verified) indicators has a ratio
of 6:5 (55% answer rate), warning (caller ID cannot be trusted) indicators has the lowest
ratio of 6:8 (43% answer rate) upon an incoming call. In the comments, one participant
stated that “The notification was very beneficial as it told me the ID could not be trusted.
Thanks for the warning! :)”. Another participant stated that “this made me cautious of
answering. “ We also received 2 emails from the participants near the end of the study in
which they commented that they thought the app was helpful. This is good preliminary
evidence showing that the respective security indicator can influence the user’s incoming
call action in the right direction.
One question that rose up in our minds is that: why are group 1 participants generally
more likely to answer than group 0? We only expected participants to more likely answer
when being shown a secure indicator, but why the caution and warning indicators also
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made them more likely to answer? To answer this question, we looked at the participant’s
comments. One participant stated that “I only answered because I was curious about the ef-
ficacy of this app. If I trusted this app and saw the red warning I wouldn’t have answered”.
Another participant said that “It was spam like it said, I just answered to see.” The par-
ticipants stated that even when being shown a warning indicator, and they still answered
because they curious with the content of the call. They were curious to find out what is
the content like in a phone call that displays a warning indicator. With consideration of
these results, a user is probably not going to fall for a scam call that after answering a call
with a warning or caution indicator. This is because the user would be already be expecting
to hear a scam. As we have demonstrated in the telephone phishing study in chapter 3,
vigilance is the best defense against telephone scams. If an individual is already expecting
to hear a scam, we can say that the individual is already vigilant against the scam.
Group 2 Participants
When disseminating the phone calls to group 2 participants, we called each phone num-
ber with 3 different security indicators, using our Hamout app. To avoid the order effect
of showing the security indicators, we separated participants into 3 groups, each group
receiving the calls in a different order.
We received a total of 54 records and 6 comments from the participants in group 3.
Looking at the data, the participants in this group has a 23:31 ratio of answering vs de-
clining/ignoring (43% answer rate) upon an incoming call from us. Looking at the break
down of ratios of different security indicators: secure (caller ID is verified) indicators has
the highest ratio of 6:2 (75% answer rate), caution (caller ID is not verified) indicators has
a ratio of 10:17 (37% answer rate), warning (caller ID cannot be trusted) indicators has the
lowest ratio of 6:11 (35% answer rate) upon an incoming call. In the comments, we also
see that the participants stated the notification was useful and some stated that they were
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curious and just answered to see what the content of the call might be. These results are
not surprising as it can be explained by the same discussion in group 1.
One thing that we notice is that we have a larger than expected number of records
on caution indicators. This is unexpected because we disseminated the same number of
phone calls for each of the three types of security indicators. The larger than expected
caution indicators mean that either some of the ACRs sent were not delivered or some
of the ACRs were not delivered before the phone call arrived. This further validates the
performance analysis results that the SMS delivery mechanism is not always consistent. In
future design iterations, we will need to incorporate a more consistent and reliable ACR
delivery mechanism. As mentioned before, we believe that cloud message can be a good
solution but this will need further testing to confirm. We also believe that the best future
should be the integration of the ACR within the call request header itself.
Age Gender Occupation Education
18-35 35 Male 41 Student 49 Bachelor’s 19
25-34 17 Female 12 Faculty 1 Master’s 7
Unspecified 5 Unspecified 4 Employed 1 Some college credit 7
Self-Employed 1 High school 6
Unspecified 5 Doctorate 2
Associate 2
Unspecified 14
Table 6.3: Demographics of the Participants
6.3.4 Interview Findings
After the experiments, we followed up with some of the participants to further under-
stand what they thought about the user experience of the app. We made email correspon-
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dence with 7 participants. The interviews targeted active users of the mobile app based on
our feedback data. Our interviews were conducted in an open response feedback style, we
asked the interviewees for feedback on a set of leading questions and then recorded their
responses. Most of the questions were open response questions, and many were generated
on the spot to follow up on the interviewee’s answer. With the interviews, we discovered
many areas of interest that were not gathered from the app, and we were able to go deep
into discussing the area of interest. We did not set a time limit on our interview process,
we only stop the interviewing process when we felt that a state of saturation is reached. In
total, we carried out 3 interview sessions where each participant comes from each different
group.
When being asked about the app’s user experience, all of our interviewees at some point
mentioned that they hoped the app could help them identify unknown and unwanted calls.
All interviewees stated that they received robocalls and scams calls at some point in their
life and they wish that this app could help to prevent these types of calls for them. Although
the prototype app was designed to only identify calls that are from our phone calls, they
wanted to see a security indicator on phone calls that are not from us. Our group 0 partic-
ipant also mentioned that she suspected if the app was working when she received phone
calls and no security indicators showed up. When being asked about whether showing se-
curity indicators frequently would annoy them, all of them stated that they would not mind
having frequent displays. If the app displays the security indicators too frequently, the apps
could be designed such that there is an option to removed security indicator for certain
types of phone calls, such as for some existing contacts or for a specific phone number.
Therefore, in future designs, we should design the app to consistently or more frequently
provide security indicator on telephone calls. This could be achieved by collecting more
information from the users during the initial setup process. Also, we could allow other
recipients to submit information about certain phone numbers.
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All of our interviewees did not realize that the caller ID is spoofable and could be used
to impersonate a known contact. The interviewees did not think that our app was mainly
designed to prevent caller ID spoofing. They were more interested in the informational
aspect of the security indicator. Interestingly, one of the interviewees revealed that he uses
a similar call notification app, Truecaller. Truecaller is a caller name directory app and
his experience with Truecaller is that it tends to be inaccurate because it allowed users to
arbitrarily submit a name associated with their phone number without verification. True-
caller often shows a wrong name associated with the phone number. When being asked
about what differentiates our app from Truecaller, he thinks that our app seems to be more
security focused because of the phone number verification and therefore has the potential
to be more accurate. He hopes that our app can be more accurate than Truecaller while
being more capable of providing warnings.
On the design of the security indicator, one of interviewee stated that the warning in-
dicator should be bigger and more visible than other indicators. He also suggested adding
animation to the warning indicator might help to make it more visible. Because the goal
of the app is to prevent the recipient from falling victim to phone scams, he was worried
that some people might ignore the indicator or forget that it is a scam call. He stated that
for example, his grandparent might be the kind of user that would ignore the indicator or
forget that it is a scam call. We can draw a similarity to the way Google Chrome shows its
warnings, where the web browser shows a red color warning in full page for a malicious
site. Google Chrome shows a much more visible indicator for malicious sites than secure
sites. This is the reason why we should design the telephone security indicator to give more
emphasis on malicious phone calls.
Two interviewees also recommended that the security indicator should give more infor-
mation, such that information about the type of caller and the location of the caller. These
are information can help to determine whether to answer the call. For example, they wanted
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the yellow caution to show if the caller is a telemarketer. It would also be interesting to
know the real GPS location of the caller because the area code location of the caller is often
misleading.
On the benefits of green/secure indicators, the interviewees generally believe that it
would be most useful for urgent and important calls from known organizations. One inter-
viewee also suggested that it would useful for calls from package delivery services or store
pickup notifications, where it would be helpful to know when a package is waiting to be
picked up. The interviewee also stated that the green/secure indicators would also help to
determine whether to call back after missing the incoming call.
On whether the app performance was satisfactory, the interviewees generally think that
the app was responsive enough to display the security indicators during the incoming call.
None of the interviewees felt that the app is was causing performance issues on their smart-
phones. The interviewees generally did not think the app was trading off performance for
the feature.
6.4 Discussion
With this empirical study, the findings showed that the display of security indicators
for authenticated caller ID transmission can help users to determine whether to answer an
incoming phone call. The findings of this study also suggest several recommendations for
the implementation of authenticated caller ID transmission to make it more reliable, useful,
and user-friendly.
The first recommendation is that the delivery mechanism for the Authenticated Call
Request should be made more reliable by using an alternative out-of-band channel such as
cloud messaging, or integrating the ACR as an essential part of the call request procedure.
This is important, because if the ACR could not be consistently delivered, the users may
miss out on important secure or warning indicators.
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The second recommendation is that the end-user implementation should be more en-
gaging for the user. It needs to provide frequent displays of security indicators to help
the users realize that the app is working. While doing so, it would also be useful provide
customization options for the users to disable the indicators for certain known callers that
do not require high security. The ability to provide feedback for certain callers is another
way that we can engage the user. With more user engagement, users are more likely to feel
satisfied and less likely to abandon the feature.
The third recommendation is that the implementation should focus more on the design
of warning indicators. The warning indicator should be made bigger and more visible than
other indicators. The warning indicators should provide more notice to discourage the user
to answer the call or help to instill vigilance against the caller. We also think that it might
be helpful to add more information on why the call might be harmful.
Finally, we recommend adding more information to the security indicators, especially
for unknown callers. For instance, it would be helpful to show if the caller is a telemarketer
and the real GPS location of the caller. While doing so, it would important the ensure that
the information is accurate. Existing caller directory apps suffer from inaccuracies, which
is what our implementation can differentiate from existing products. Our app provides
phone number verification, therefore, the information associated with the caller is more
accurate. In future implementation, the app should also provide more information about
the caller while keeping the information accurate.
6.5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored how a mobile app might serve as an implementation
of security indicators for authenticated caller ID transmission to help telephone users dis-
tinguish between important and potentially unwanted telephone calls. Our approach has
been to design and evaluate the Hamout and Caller ID verifier apps, which implements
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authenticated caller ID transmission and security indicators from caller ID verification. To
evaluate the encryption performance, we provided a performance analysis of different en-
cryption implementations of Hamout and was able show to that the encryption scheme
would not introduce a perceivable delay to the call request. We also evaluated the deliv-
ery mechanism for the Authenticated Call Request and found that SMS delivery makes a
significant impact on the user experience due to its inconsistent delay from carriers. This
inspired us to recommend using cloud messaging or the call header itself to deliver the
ACR in future designs. We also performed an empirical user study of using the Caller ID
verifier app to evaluate the user experience and behavior upon seeing telephone security
indicators. By collecting the participants’ incoming call behavior, we learned that the tele-
phone security indicators overall did help to influence the participants to answer important
calls and avoid unwanted calls. Through feedback and interviews from participants, we
identified several strategies to further improve future designs. In future work, we plan to
expand this work from an proof-of-concept prototype conducted on a small focus group to
a production-quality implementation conducted on a larger community to explore the bene-
fits of authenticated caller ID transmission, and work toward a self-sustainable community
where telephone spam, scam, fraud, phishing or vishing can be effectively prevented.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
Telephone spam, including scam, phishing, vishing, robocall, and telemarketing, has
become an increasingly prevalent issue worldwide. Today, solutions primarily rely on
blacklists of known scam numbers do not work effectively on spam calls when the caller ID
has been spoofed. In this dissertation, we have presented motivation, background, survey,
design, architecture, implementation and evaluation of the proposed caller ID authentica-
tion scheme for the telephone network that provides the possibility of a security indicator
that will help prevent users from falling victim to telephone spam and scams. In this chap-
ter, we summarize the major achievements of this dissertation that contributed to solving
the telephone spam and scam problem.
With telephone scams becoming increasingly prevalent, it is crucial to understand what
causes the recipients to fall for these scams. Armed with this knowledge, effective counter-
measures can be developed to challenge the key foundations of successful telephone phish-
ing attacks. In chapter 3, we presented the methodology, design, execution, results, anal-
ysis, and evaluation in the quest of answering why telephone scam works. The study per-
formed 10 telephone phishing experiments on 3,000 university participants without prior
awareness over the course of a work week. Overall, we were able to identify at least one
key factor that had a significant effect in tricking the victims into revealing their social
security information. Our evaluation recommended solutions designed to target imperson-
ation and instill vigilance to prevent users from falling victim to telephone phishing. The
work in this chapter is currently under review in the proceedings of IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy 2018.
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As many are now undertaking the crusade of curbing the telephone spam problem, sur-
veying the existing solutions in combating telephone spam and, by analyzing the failings
of the current techniques, we can derive the requirements that are critical to an acceptable
solution. In chapter 4, we described the key challenges in solving the telephone spam prob-
lem, specifically focusing on the differences between email and telephone spam. Then, we
survey the existing telephone spam solutions and, by analyzing the failings of the current
techniques, derive evaluation criteria that are critical to an acceptable solution. This work
helped to guide the development of effective telephone spam defenses, as well as provide
a framework to evaluate future defenses. The work in this chapter was published in the
proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016 [45].
Caller ID is at the heart of stopping telephone spam—a variety of apps and services,
including law enforcement, rely on the caller ID information to defend against unwanted
callers. However, spammers are using spoofed caller IDs to defeat call blockers, to evade
identification, and to further a variety of scams. To provide a solution to this problem, in
chapter 5, we proposed a standardized authentication scheme for the caller ID that enables
the possibility of a security indicator for telecommunication. The goal of this proposal is
to help prevent users from falling victim to telephone spam and scams, as well as provide
a foundation for future and existing defenses to stop unwanted telephone communication
based on the caller ID information. Calls from legitimate callers, such as billing, delivery,
banking, government, and law enforcement organizations, would also benefit from provid-
ing authenticity of their caller IDs, as their recipients would be certain that the caller is
real and not an impostor, therefore feel better assured receiving communication over the
phone. The work in this chapter was published in the proceedings of the ITU Kaleidoscope
2016 [56], the IEEE Communications Standards Magazine 2017 September Issue [163], a
USPTO non-provisional patent application [164], and a pending technical standards con-
tribution at the study group 11 of the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector.
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With a description of the architecture, protocols, and security mechanisms of the caller
ID authentication scheme, the next step is to follow up the proposed authentication scheme
with a user study to understand the user behavior when they see the security indicators,
learn about the potential use cases of caller ID authentication, and make future improve-
ments to caller ID authentication implementation. In chapter 6, we described an end-user
prototype design and implementation of the proposed caller ID authentication scheme. Af-
ter implementing the prototype, we conducted a performance analysis and an end user study
and collected the participants’ feedback and behavior data. We presented the results of the
user study and provide a performance analysis and evaluation of the feedback and behav-
ior data from the study. Finally, we provided recommendations for the future end-user
implementations of security indicators for the authenticated caller ID transmission.
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